Journal of Applied Mathematics

  • J. Appl. Math.
  • Volume 2014, Special Issue (2013), Article ID 415686, 7 pages.

Local Interactions and p-Best Response Set

J. Durieu and P. Solal

Full-text: Open access

Abstract

We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions on the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents about the matching rule. We show that only actions contained in the minimal p-best response set can be selected provided that p is sufficiently small. We demonstrate that these predictions are sensitive to the assumptions about the matching rule.

Article information

Source
J. Appl. Math., Volume 2014, Special Issue (2013), Article ID 415686, 7 pages.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 1 October 2014

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jam/1412177637

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1155/2014/415686

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR3191117

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
07010626

Citation

Durieu, J.; Solal, P. Local Interactions and p -Best Response Set. J. Appl. Math. 2014, Special Issue (2013), Article ID 415686, 7 pages. doi:10.1155/2014/415686. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jam/1412177637


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