Abstract
Tense logic is often said to possess insufficient expressive resources to serve as a theory of the nature of time. This paper counters this objection by showing how to obtain quantification over times in a tense logic in which all temporal distinctions are ultimately spelled out in terms of the two simple tense operators "it was the case that" and "it will be the case that." This account of times is similar to what is known as "linguistic ersatzism" about possible worlds, but there are noteworthy differences between these two cases. In particular, while linguistic ersatzism would support actualism, the view of times defended here does not support presentism.
Citation
Ulrich Meyer. "Times in Tense Logic." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 50 (2) 201 - 219, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2009-007
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