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Winter 1996 Tarski on Logical Consequence
Mario Gómez-Torrente
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 37(1): 125-151 (Winter 1996). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1040067321


This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the $\omega$-rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, and notably John Etchemendy, who have claimed that his definition does not satisfy those desiderata. A secondary aim of the paper is to offer some basic elements for an understanding of Tarski's definition in the historical logico-philosophical context in which it was proposed. Such historical understanding provides useful insights on Tarski's informal ideas on logical consequence and their internal cohesion.


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Mario Gómez-Torrente. "Tarski on Logical Consequence." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 37 (1) 125 - 151, Winter 1996.


Published: Winter 1996
First available in Project Euclid: 16 December 2002

zbMATH: 1186.03010
MathSciNet: MR1379554
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1040067321

Primary: 03-03
Secondary: 01A60 , 03A05

Rights: Copyright © 1996 University of Notre Dame

Vol.37 • No. 1 • Winter 1996
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