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November, 1976 Agreeing to Disagree
Robert J. Aumann
Ann. Statist. 4(6): 1236-1239 (November, 1976). DOI: 10.1214/aos/1176343654

Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event $E$ if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event $A$ are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

Citation

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Robert J. Aumann. "Agreeing to Disagree." Ann. Statist. 4 (6) 1236 - 1239, November, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176343654

Information

Published: November, 1976
First available in Project Euclid: 12 April 2007

zbMATH: 0379.62003
MathSciNet: MR433654
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1214/aos/1176343654

Subjects:
Primary: 62A15
Secondary: 62C05 , 90A05 , 90D35

Keywords: concensus , Game theory , Harsanyi doctrine , Information , Posterior , revising probabilities , statistics , subjective probability

Rights: Copyright © 1976 Institute of Mathematical Statistics

Vol.4 • No. 6 • November, 1976
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