Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar in Grundgesetze Section 10

Bruno Bentzen

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Abstract

This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Frege’s solution limited to value-ranges and truth-values proposed to resolve the “problem of indeterminacy of reference” in Section 10 of Grundgesetze is a violation of his principle of complete determination, which states that a predicate must be defined to apply for all objects in general. Closely related to this doubt is the common allegation that Frege was unable to solve a persistent version of the Caesar problem for value-ranges. It is argued that, in Frege’s standards of reducing arithmetic to logic, his solution to the indeterminacy does not give rise to any sort of Caesar problem in the book.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 60, Number 4 (2019), 617-637.

Dates
Received: 12 April 2017
Accepted: 29 June 2018
First available in Project Euclid: 30 September 2019

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1569830414

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1215/00294527-2019-0022

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR4019864

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
07167760

Subjects
Primary: 00A30: Philosophy of mathematics [See also 03A05]

Keywords
indeterminacy of reference value-ranges Caesar problem Frege

Citation

Bentzen, Bruno. Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar in Grundgesetze Section 10. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 60 (2019), no. 4, 617--637. doi:10.1215/00294527-2019-0022. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1569830414


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