Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
- Notre Dame J. Formal Logic
- Volume 45, Number 2 (2004), 73-98.
Frege's Proof of Referentiality
I present a novel interpretation of Frege's attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29--31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege's proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege's proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which it may successfully be applied.
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 45, Number 2 (2004), 73-98.
First available in Project Euclid: 16 September 2004
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Linnebo, Øystein. Frege's Proof of Referentiality. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 45 (2004), no. 2, 73--98. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1095386645. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1095386645