Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

Editor's Introduction

André Fuhrmann

Abstract

The process [by which any individual settles into new opinions] is always the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain…. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one most felicitously and expediently.

The new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible. (William James, Lectures on Pragmatism, 1907)

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 36, Number 1 (1995), 1-14.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 19 December 2002

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1040308825

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040308825

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1359105

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0834.03007

Subjects
Primary: 03B60: Other nonclassical logic
Secondary: 68T27: Logic in artificial intelligence

Citation

Fuhrmann, André. Editor's Introduction. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 36 (1995), no. 1, 1--14. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1040308825. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1040308825


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