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Fall 1996 Field on the Notion of Consistency
Ken Akiba
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 37(4): 625-630 (Fall 1996). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1040046146

Abstract

Field's claim that we have a notion of consistency which is neither model-theoretic nor proof-theoretic but primitive, is examined and criticized. His argument is compared to similar examinations by Kreisel and Etchemendy, and Etchemendy's distinction between interpretational and representational semantics is employed to reveal the flaw in Field's argument.

Citation

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Ken Akiba. "Field on the Notion of Consistency." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 37 (4) 625 - 630, Fall 1996. https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040046146

Information

Published: Fall 1996
First available in Project Euclid: 16 December 2002

zbMATH: 0883.03002
MathSciNet: MR1446233
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1040046146

Subjects:
Primary: 03A05
Secondary: 00A30

Rights: Copyright © 1996 University of Notre Dame

Vol.37 • No. 4 • Fall 1996
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