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Fall 1997 The Ontology of Impossible Worlds
David A. Vander Laan
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38(4): 597-620 (Fall 1997). DOI: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540772

Abstract

The best arguments for possible worlds as states of affairs furnish us with equally good arguments for impossible worlds of the same sort. I argue for a theory of impossible worlds on which the impossible worlds correspond to maximal inconsistent classes of propositions. Three objections are rejected. In the final part of the paper, I present a menu of impossible worlds and explore some of their interesting formal properties.

Citation

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David A. Vander Laan. "The Ontology of Impossible Worlds." Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 38 (4) 597 - 620, Fall 1997. https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1039540772

Information

Published: Fall 1997
First available in Project Euclid: 10 December 2002

zbMATH: 0923.03015
MathSciNet: MR1648855
Digital Object Identifier: 10.1305/ndjfl/1039540772

Subjects:
Primary: 03A05
Secondary: 03B45

Rights: Copyright © 1997 University of Notre Dame

Vol.38 • No. 4 • Fall 1997
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