Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

A Kripkean Approach to Unknowability and Truth

Leon Horsten

Abstract

We consider a language containing partial predicates for subjective knowability and truth. For this language, inductive hierarchy rules are proposed which build up the extension and anti-extension of these partial predicates in stages. The logical interaction between the extension of the truth predicate and the anti-extension of the knowability predicate is investigated.

Article information

Source
Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 39, Number 3 (1998), 389-405.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 6 December 2002

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039182253

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039182253

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR1741545

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0981.03010

Subjects
Primary: 03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

Citation

Horsten, Leon. A Kripkean Approach to Unknowability and Truth. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 39 (1998), no. 3, 389--405. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039182253. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1039182253


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