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February 2008 A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for a Stable Matching Problem with Linear Valuations and Bounded Side Payments
Rashid Farooq
Japan J. Indust. Appl. Math. 25(1): 83-98 (February 2008).

Abstract

We study an extension of the Gale--Shapley marriage model and the Shapley--Shubik assignment model by considering linear valuations and bounded side payments. Our model includes the Eriksson--Karlander hybrid model as a special case. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm which finds a pairwise-stable outcome.

Citation

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Rashid Farooq. "A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for a Stable Matching Problem with Linear Valuations and Bounded Side Payments." Japan J. Indust. Appl. Math. 25 (1) 83 - 98, February 2008.

Information

Published: February 2008
First available in Project Euclid: 14 April 2008

zbMATH: 1142.91692
MathSciNet: MR2410544

Keywords: assignment game , stable marriage model

Rights: Copyright © 2008 The Japan Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

Vol.25 • No. 1 • February 2008
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