Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society

Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games

Morton Davis and Michael Maschler

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Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., Volume 69, Number 1 (1963), 106-108.

First available in Project Euclid: 4 July 2007

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Davis, Morton; Maschler, Michael. Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 69 (1963), no. 1, 106--108. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bams/1183525019

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  • 1. R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler, The bargaining set for cooperative games. (Expected to appear in No. 52 of Annals of Mathematics Studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.)
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  • 3. B. Knaster, C. Kuratowski and S. Mazurkiewicz, Ein Beweis des Fixpunktsatzes für n-dimensionale Simplexe, Fund. Math. 14 (1929), 132-137.
  • 4. B. Peleg, Existence theorem for the bargaining set M1(i), Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 69 (1963), 109-110.