The Annals of Statistics

Bayes's Two Arguments for The Rule of Conditioning

Glenn Shafer

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Abstract

The introductory section of Thomas Bayes's famous essay on probability contains two arguments for what we now call the rule of conditioning. The first argument, which leads to Bayes's third proposition, can be made rigorous if we use rooted trees to represent the step-by-step determination of events. The second argument, which leads to Bayes's fifth proposition, does not stand up to scrutiny.

Article information

Source
Ann. Statist., Volume 10, Number 4 (1982), 1075-1089.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 12 April 2007

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176345974

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1214/aos/1176345974

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR673644

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0502.62002

JSTOR
links.jstor.org

Subjects
Primary: 60A05: Axioms; other general questions
Secondary: 62A15

Keywords
Bayes conditional probability exact events rooted trees

Citation

Shafer, Glenn. Bayes's Two Arguments for The Rule of Conditioning. Ann. Statist. 10 (1982), no. 4, 1075--1089. doi:10.1214/aos/1176345974. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176345974


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