Abstract and Applied Analysis

Preference Integration and Optimization of Multistage Weighted Voting System Based on Ordinal Preference

Yu-ke Chen, Yan Zou, and Zhe Chen

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Multistage voting is a common voting form through which the winners are selected. By virtue of weighted multistage voting rules, in this paper, we establish a weighted voting model by analyzing the correlation between individual preference and group preference. The weights of voters in each voting stage are adjusted through preference deviation degrees between individual preferences and group preference, and the ranking among candidates in each stage is determined according to weighted Borda function value. Examples are given to verify our model, which shows that weighted information aggregation model can mine more useful information from different individual preferences of voters to quicken the aggregation of group preference.

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Abstr. Appl. Anal., Volume 2014, Special Issue (2014), Article ID 186545, 6 pages.

First available in Project Euclid: 6 October 2014

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Chen, Yu-ke; Zou, Yan; Chen, Zhe. Preference Integration and Optimization of Multistage Weighted Voting System Based on Ordinal Preference. Abstr. Appl. Anal. 2014, Special Issue (2014), Article ID 186545, 6 pages. doi:10.1155/2014/186545. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aaa/1412606027

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