

On Interpretations of Arithmetic and Set Theory

Richard Kaye and Tin Lok Wong

Abstract This paper starts by investigating Ackermann's interpretation of finite set theory in the natural numbers. We give a formal version of this interpretation from Peano arithmetic (PA) to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the infinity axiom negated (ZF–inf) and provide an inverse interpretation going the other way. In particular, we emphasize the precise axiomatization of our set theory that is required and point out the necessity of the axiom of transitive containment or (equivalently) the axiom scheme of \in -induction. This clarifies the nature of the equivalence of PA and ZF–inf and corrects some errors in the literature. We also survey the restrictions of the Ackermann interpretation and its inverse to subsystems of PA and ZF–inf, where full induction, replacement, or separation is not assumed. The paper concludes with a discussion on the problems one faces when the totality of exponentiation fails, or when the existence of unordered pairs or power sets is not guaranteed.

1 Introduction

The work described in this article starts with a piece of mathematical “folklore” that is “well known” but for which we know no satisfactory reference.

Folklore Result The first-order theories Peano arithmetic and ZF set theory with the axiom of infinity negated are equivalent, in the sense that each is interpretable in the other and the interpretations are inverse to each other.

This would make an excellent starting point for any beginning research student working in the area of models of Peano arithmetic, since an understanding of how these interpretations work enables all coding techniques from set theory to be employed in arithmetic in a uniform way, and also places PA “on the map” (in the sense of consistency and interpretation strength) relative to set theory. This, combined with the lack of suitable references, permits us, we trust, to omit any apology for investigating such folklore. In fact, when the details were finally uncovered, there were surprises

Received July 15, 2006; accepted March 22, 2007; printed October 22, 2007
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary, 03H15; Secondary, 03C62
Keywords: Peano arithmetic, finite set theory, interpretations
©2007 University of Notre Dame

for both authors—this is the reason for the quotation marks when we said that the folkloric result above is “well known.”

We should be more precise and highlight exactly where the imprecision in the folkloric result lies. There are two places: first, the notion of “ZF set theory with the axiom of infinity negated” turns out to be dependent in quite an important way on the preferred choice of the initial presentation of ZF; second, the idea of interpretations being “inverse to each other” admits important variations. For example, Chang and Keisler [4], §A.31, specify one particular choice of axiomatization of ZF; for this axiomatization a weak form of interpretation-equivalence of “ZF with infinity negated” and PA can be proved, but for stronger notions of interpretation-equivalence a different axiomatization of ZF seems to be required.

Our notation and terminology is standard. For a text on set theory we have used Drake [6], though many others would be suitable. For background on Peano arithmetic we refer the reader to Kaye [10], and especially Chapter 10 for background on subsystems of PA.

2 Interpretations

The first issue to address here is what we shall mean by “interpretation” and when interpretations are “inverse” to one another. In fact, for the folkloric result we are addressing, the notion of interpretation required is very straightforward and concrete, but in general the word “interpretation” is used in many contexts and with many different meanings in logic and model theory.

As pointed out elsewhere, notably by Visser [15], notions of interpretation can be best brought together using a category theoretic framework, though in this paper we use category theory simply as a notational device. For us, an *interpretation* \mathfrak{i} of a theory T_2 in a theory T_1 is a morphism $\mathfrak{i}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ in a particular category being studied.

To define the particular category we will use in this paper, let us agree that an \mathcal{L} -theory is a consistent set of \mathcal{L} -sentences (not necessarily complete or closed under deduction) and we make the convenient assumptions that all languages are purely relational, equality ($=$) being one of the relation symbols, and a further unary relation $\text{Dom}()$ for the domain is always present. Full first-order logic is assumed, including all the rules for equality and the additional logical axiom $\forall x \text{Dom}(x)$. For us here, an interpretation $\mathfrak{i}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ of an \mathcal{L}_2 -theory T_2 in an \mathcal{L}_1 -theory T_1 is given by a mapping of atomic formulas $R(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$ of \mathcal{L}_2 to formulas $R(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)^{\mathfrak{i}}$ of \mathcal{L}_1 in the same free variables. In particular, the domain and equality on this domain are defined by $\text{Dom}(x)^{\mathfrak{i}}$ and $(x = y)^{\mathfrak{i}}$. The mapping extends to all first-order formulas in the natural way by setting $(\neg\theta(\bar{x}))^{\mathfrak{i}}$ to be $\neg\theta(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{i}}$, $(\varphi(\bar{x}) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{x}))^{\mathfrak{i}}$ to be $\varphi(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{i}} \rightarrow \psi(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{i}}$, and $(\forall y \theta(\bar{x}, y))^{\mathfrak{i}}$ to be $\forall y (\text{Dom}(y)^{\mathfrak{i}} \rightarrow \theta(\bar{x}, y)^{\mathfrak{i}})$. For this to define an interpretation, we shall insist that $T_1 \vdash \exists x \text{Dom}(x)^{\mathfrak{i}}$ and $T_1 \vdash \sigma^{\mathfrak{i}}$ for every axiom $\sigma \in T_2$. Visser calls such interpretations *relative interpretations*.

The category of theories and interpretations is obtained by taking theories as objects and such mappings \mathfrak{i} as morphisms, where we choose to say that $\mathfrak{f}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ and $\mathfrak{g}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ are *equal* if $T_1 \vdash \forall \bar{x} (R(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{f}} \leftrightarrow R(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{g}})$ for all R in \mathcal{L}_2 . This makes a category, where the identity interpretation $1 = 1_T: T \rightarrow T$ is the morphism given up to this equality by the mapping $R(\bar{x})^1 = R(\bar{x})$ for all R . The composition $\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{f}: T_3 \rightarrow T_1$ of morphisms $\mathfrak{f}: T_3 \rightarrow T_2$ and $\mathfrak{g}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ is given by

$(R(\bar{x}))^{(\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{f})} = (R(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{f}})^{\mathfrak{g}}$, and associativity holds as can easily be checked. (It is somewhat annoying that the convenient notation of writing interpretation-applications as superscripts is at odds with the usual maps-on-left convention for morphisms.) As usual, two morphisms $\mathfrak{f}: T \rightarrow S$ and $\mathfrak{g}: S \rightarrow T$ are said to be *inverse* to each other if $\mathfrak{f}\mathfrak{g} = 1_S$ and $\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{f} = 1_T$. An *interpretation* is then a morphism in this category, that is, a mapping as described in the last paragraph modulo the equivalence given by this notion of equality.

As for many kinds of interpretations, ours respects derivability in first-order logic because of the way our mappings were defined on nonatomic formulas. Thus we have the following proposition.

Proposition 2.1 *Let $\mathfrak{f}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ and suppose $T_2 \vdash \sigma$. Then $T_1 \vdash \sigma^{\mathfrak{f}}$. \square*

The next proposition follows from the definitions just given and an induction on formulas.

Proposition 2.2 *Let $\mathfrak{f}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ and $\mathfrak{g}: T_2 \rightarrow T_1$ be equal as interpretations. Then for each formula $\theta(\bar{x})$ of \mathcal{L}_2 we have $T_1 \vdash \forall \bar{x} (\theta(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{f}} \leftrightarrow \theta(\bar{x})^{\mathfrak{g}})$. In particular, for each sentence σ of \mathcal{L}_2 , $T_1 \vdash \sigma^{\mathfrak{f}}$ if and only if $T_1 \vdash \sigma^{\mathfrak{g}}$. \square*

3 The Ackermann Interpretation

By ZF–inf we mean the theory in the first-order language \mathcal{L}_\in of set theory with all the usual axioms of ZF except infinity, which is negated. More specifically, and following Baratella and Ferro [2], let the set theory EST have the usual axioms or axiom schemes of extensionality, existence of the empty set, pair set, sum set, separation and replacement;¹ denote the axiom of power set by Pow, the axiom of foundation, expressed as $\forall x (x \neq \emptyset \rightarrow \exists y \in x \forall z \in x z \notin y)$, by Found, and the usual axiom of infinity, that is, $\exists w (\emptyset \in w \wedge \forall x \in w (x \cup \{x\} \in w))$, by Inf. Then ZF–inf is EST together with Pow, Found, \neg Inf.

It was observed in 1937 by Ackermann [1] that \mathbb{N} with the membership relation defined by

$$n \in m \text{ iff the } n\text{th digit in the binary representation of } m \text{ is } 1$$

satisfies ZF–inf. This interpretation, formalized in ZF with ω in place of \mathbb{N} yields a bijection between ω and the collection V_ω of hereditarily finite sets.

This interpretation has been given extensive treatment in the literature. Working in PA (or a suitable fragment of PA) one may define the interpretation by setting $\text{Dom}(x)^\alpha$ to be ‘Dom(x)’, $(x = y)^\alpha$ to be ‘ $x = y$ ’, and $(x \in y)^\alpha$ to be

$$\exists w < y \exists p \leq y \exists r < p (p = 2^x \wedge y = (2w + 1)p + r).$$

We will refer to this interpretation throughout the rest of the paper as the *Ackermann interpretation*.

All that is required for this to work is a suitable formula $p = 2^x$ that represents ‘ p is the x th power of 2’. In fact, many such formulas are known which have the necessary inductive definition

$$1 = 2^0 \wedge \forall x \forall p (p = 2^x \rightarrow 2p = 2^{x+1}) \quad (1)$$

and partial-function nature

$$\forall x \forall p \forall q (p = 2^x \wedge q = 2^x \rightarrow p = q) \quad (2)$$

provable in PA or even much weaker systems, including Δ_0 formulas $p = 2^x$ for which the above statements are provable in the subsystem of PA with induction on Δ_0 formulas only (see Gaifman and Dimitracopoulos [8] or Hájek and Pudlák [9], §I.1(b)).

Making extensive use of the axiom scheme of induction, it is straightforward to check that every model of PA with this binary relation defined satisfies ZF–inf.

Theorem 3.1 $\alpha: \text{ZF–inf} \rightarrow \text{PA}$. □

More information on this interpretation in subsystems of PA is given in Section 7 below.

4 The Ordinal Interpretation

The finite ordinals in the standard model of ZFC resemble the usual natural numbers. In a world without infinite numbers, one would expect the class of all ordinals to satisfy the ordinary rules of arithmetic.

Definition 4.1 $\text{Trans}(x)$ (' x is transitive') is the formula

$$\forall y, z (z \in y \wedge y \in x \rightarrow z \in x),$$

and $x \in \text{On}$ (' x is an ordinal') is

$$\text{Trans}(x) \wedge \forall y, z \in x (y \in z \vee y = z \vee z \in y).$$

Most ordinal theory can be done inside our theory of sets just as it is in ZF. See, for example, Chapter 2 of Drake [6] for details. However, as an easy consequence of $\neg\text{Inf}$, every nonzero ordinal is a successor ordinal—there are no limit ordinals in ZF–inf.

Theorem 4.2 $\text{ZF–inf} \vdash \forall x (x \in \text{On} \leftrightarrow x = \emptyset \vee \exists y \in \text{On} (x = y \cup \{y\}))$. □

As a corollary, every set of ordinals in ZF–inf has a maximum element.

Corollary 4.3 $\text{ZF–inf} \vdash \forall x \subseteq \text{On} (x \neq \emptyset \rightarrow \bigcup x \in x)$. □

Arithmetic of ordinals can be defined in the usual way, and there is no problem at all in showing that the ordinals with usual arithmetic yield an interpretation of PA in ZF–inf.

Definition 4.4 Let $\text{Dom}(x)^0$ be ' $x \in \text{On}$ ', $(x = y)^0$ be ' $x = y$ ', $(x < y)^0$ be ' $x \in y$ ', $(x + y = z)^0$ be ' $x + y = z$ ' (ordinal addition), and $(x \cdot y = z)^0$ be ' $x \times y = z$ ' (ordinal multiplication).

Theorem 4.5 $\nu: \text{PA} \rightarrow \text{ZF–inf}$. □

Thus PA and ZF–inf have the same consistency strength, but this interpretation is clearly not inverse to the Ackermann interpretation.

5 Epsilon Induction and Transitive Containment

In order to define an inverse to the Ackermann interpretation we shall need to consider the principle of \in -induction.

Definition 5.1 For an \mathcal{L}_\in -formula $\varphi(x, \bar{y})$, $I_\in \varphi$ is the sentence

$$\forall \bar{y} (\forall x (\forall w \in x \varphi(w, \bar{y}) \rightarrow \varphi(x, \bar{y})) \rightarrow \forall x \varphi(x, \bar{y})).$$

$\in\text{-Ind}$ denotes the scheme $\{I_\in \psi : \psi(x, \bar{y}) \text{ is an } \mathcal{L}_\in\text{-formula}\}$.

It turns out that not every model of ZF–inf admits \in -induction. This is proved using the closely related notion of the *transitive closure* of a set.

Definition 5.2 Define $y = \text{TC}(x)$ (' y is the transitive closure of x ') to be

$$y \supseteq x \wedge \text{Trans}(y) \wedge \forall y' (y' \supseteq x \wedge \text{Trans}(y') \rightarrow y' \supseteq y).$$

TC is the axiom $\forall x \exists u \supseteq x \text{Trans}(u)$.

It is easy to check (using extensionality) that the transitive closure $y = \text{TC}(x)$ of a set x , if it exists, is unique. The \mathcal{L}_\in -sentence TC says that every set is *contained* in a transitive set. This turns out to be equivalent to the apparently stronger statement that every set has a transitive closure over a weak fragment of ZF–inf, because the transitive closure of a set x can alternatively be defined as the intersection of all transitive sets containing x .

Lemma 5.3 $\text{EST} \vdash \forall x (\exists y (y \supseteq x \wedge \text{Trans}(y)) \rightarrow \exists y (\text{TC}(x) = y))$. \square

Over $\text{EST} + \text{Found}$, the axiom of transitive containment or closure is equivalent to \in -induction. In fact, a single instance of \in -induction is enough to prove the whole schema \in -Ind.

Proposition 5.4 For all $V \models \text{EST} + \text{Found}$,

$$V \models \in\text{-Ind} \Leftrightarrow V \models \text{TC}.$$

Sketch of proof Let $V \models \text{EST} \cup \in\text{-Ind}$. We prove the equivalent statement

$$V \models \forall x \exists y (y = \text{TC}(x))$$

by \in -induction on x in V .

Let $x \in V$ such that every element of x has a transitive closure. By the axioms of EST and the induction hypothesis, the set

$$\bigcup \{z : \exists x' \in x (z = \text{TC}(x'))\} \cup x$$

exists and is a transitive superset of x . So Lemma 5.3 implies x has a transitive closure, completing the induction.

The proof of the converse requires the axiom of foundation but is the same as the standard proof of \in -induction in ZF. See, for example, Chapter 2 of Drake [6]. \square

The statement TC is not, however, provable from ZF–inf. We sketch a proof here due to Mancini. (See Mancini and Zambella's article [12] for more details.)

Theorem 5.5 $\text{ZF}\text{-inf} \cup \{\neg \text{TC}\}$ is consistent.

Sketch of proof Consider the hereditarily finite sets (V_ω, \in) and the set of ordinals ω in V_ω . Let

$$\omega^* = \{\{x \cup \{x\}\} \in V_\omega : x \in \omega\},$$

the set of singletons of nonzero elements of ω . Define $F : V_\omega \rightarrow V_\omega$ by

$$F(x) = \{x \cup \{x\}\} \text{ and } F(\{x \cup \{x\}\}) = x$$

for $x \in \omega$ and $F(x) = x$ for $x \notin \omega \cup \omega^*$. Thus, F is an involution, that is, a permutation of V_ω which is a disjoint product of 2-cycles. Now define the binary relation \in_F by

$$\forall x, y \in V_\omega (x \in_F y \Leftrightarrow x \in F(y)).$$

It can be verified that $(V_\omega, \in_F) \models \text{ZF-inf}$. In addition, $(V_\omega, \in_F) \models \neg\text{TC}$. In particular,

$$(V_\omega, \in_F) \models \neg\exists u (u \supseteq \emptyset \wedge \text{Trans}(u))$$

since any such set is necessarily infinite. \square

Thus, one really needs to add the extra hypothesis TC for the \in -induction argument to work.

It seems that this result, or ones like it, were known before Mancini and Zambella's paper. Kunen [11], p. 149(29), attributes a result like this to Barwise though this model fails to satisfy the power set axiom, it seems. And Baratella and Ferro [2], p. 345, point out that the independence of transitive containment relative to other axioms of finite set theory was proved in the context of the Alternative Set Theory by Sochor. They also construct a related model (which they attribute to Kunen) in which transitive containment fails, but one in which the axiom of foundation also fails.

The following easy but important proposition shows that any inverse to the Ackermann interpretation must use TC in some form, even for rather weak systems of arithmetic.

Proposition 5.6 *Let $\alpha: \text{ZF-inf} \rightarrow \text{PA}$ be the Ackermann interpretation. Then $\text{I}\Delta_0 \vdash \text{TC}^\alpha$.*

Proof For $x \in M \models \text{I}\Delta_0$, let $y \in M$ be one less than the smallest power of 2 that is bigger than x . (Such a y exists by Δ_0 induction as there must be a greatest u such that the Δ_0 formula $\exists z \leq x \ 2^u = z$ holds.) If $M \models (u \in v \wedge v \in y)^\alpha$ then $u < v < y$ so the u th binary digit of y is 1. \square

In other words, $\alpha: \text{ZF-inf} + \text{TC} \rightarrow \text{PA}$. If $\flat: \text{PA} \rightarrow \text{ZF-inf}$ is inverse to α then we would have $\text{ZF-inf} \vdash (\text{TC}^\alpha)^\flat$ hence $\text{ZF-inf} \vdash \text{TC}$ by Proposition 2.2, which is impossible. Thus we must consider the theory $\text{ZF-inf}^* = \text{ZF-inf} + \text{TC}$ rather than ZF-inf itself.

6 The Inverse Ackermann Interpretation

Equipped with \in -induction, we obtain an inverse interpretation $\flat: \text{PA} \rightarrow \text{ZF-inf}^*$. The plan is to define a natural bijection $\flat: V \rightarrow \text{On}$ between the whole universe and the ordinals. The required interpretation can then be obtained by composing this map with the map \flat defined on On .

At first, it appears difficult to see how to use \in -induction at all, since the required inductive definition of \flat is $\flat(x) = \sum_{y \in x} 2^{\flat(y)}$ and this seems to need a separate induction on the cardinality of x —just the sort of induction we don't yet have and are trying to justify. However, there is a way round this problem using ordinal summation.

Definition 6.1 Working in $V \models \text{ZF-inf}$, let $\mathcal{P}(\text{On})$ denote the class of sets of ordinals, and let $\widehat{\Sigma}: \text{On} \times \mathcal{P}(\text{On}) \rightarrow \text{On}$ be the function defined recursively by

$$\widehat{\Sigma}(0, x) = 0$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{P}(\text{On})$, and

$$\widehat{\Sigma}(c \cup \{c\}, x) = \begin{cases} \widehat{\Sigma}(c, x), & \text{if } c \cup \{c\} \notin x, \\ \widehat{\Sigma}(c, x) + (c \cup \{c\}), & \text{if } c \cup \{c\} \in x, \end{cases}$$

for all $c \in \text{On}$ and $x \in \mathcal{P}(\text{On})$. Also, let $\Sigma : \mathcal{P}(\text{On}) \rightarrow \text{On}$ be the function defined by

$$\forall x \subseteq \text{On} \quad \Sigma(x) = \widehat{\Sigma} \left(\bigcup x, x \right).$$

Informally, this defines

$$\Sigma(x) = \sum_{y \in x} y$$

for a set of ordinals x , where the summation on the right-hand side of the equation refers to ordinal addition. Using induction on the ordinals, it can be proved that both $\widehat{\Sigma}$ and Σ are class functions definable over ZF-inf . The following definition is the place where TC comes in.

Definition 6.2 In $V \models \text{ZF-inf}^*$, define $\wp : V \rightarrow \text{On}$ recursively by

$$\wp(x) = \Sigma(\{2^{\wp(y)} \in \text{On} : y \in x\}).$$

As indicated, \wp is again a class function that can be defined by \in -recursion on all sets over ZF-inf^* . Informally, in ZF-inf^* we have

$$\wp(x) = \sum_{y \in x} 2^{\wp(y)}.$$

This is precisely the bijection we are looking for.

Proposition 6.3 ZF-inf^* proves that \wp is a bijective class function $V \rightarrow \text{On}$.

Proof The injectivity part is proved by \in -induction on all sets. The surjectivity part is proved by \in -induction on the ordinals. \square

Definition 6.4 Define a mapping \flat of atomic sentences of arithmetic into set theory by saying $\text{Dom}(x)^\flat$ is ' $\text{Dom}(x)$ ', $(x = y)^\flat$ is ' $x = y$ ', $(x < y)^\flat$ is ' $\wp(x) < \wp(y)$ ', $(x + y = z)^\flat$ is ' $\wp(x) + \wp(y) = \wp(z)$ ', and $(x \cdot y = z)^\flat$ is ' $\wp(x) \times \wp(y) = \wp(z)$ ', where the target relations and operations of $<$, $+$, and \times are the usual operations on the ordinals.

Theorem 6.5 $\flat : \text{PA} \rightarrow \text{ZF-inf}^*$.

Proof This follows from Theorem 4.5 and Propositions 5.6 and 6.3. \square

It remains to prove the following.

Theorem 6.6 The interpretations $\alpha : \text{ZF-inf}^* \rightarrow \text{PA}$ and $\flat : \text{PA} \rightarrow \text{ZF-inf}^*$ are inverse to each other.

Proof We must show that $\alpha\flat = 1_{\text{PA}}$ and $\flat\alpha = 1_{\text{ZF-inf}^*}$, that

$$\text{PA} \vdash \forall \bar{x} ((\sigma(\bar{x}))^\flat)^\alpha \leftrightarrow \sigma(\bar{x})$$

and

$$\text{ZF-inf}^* \vdash \forall \bar{x} ((\tau(\bar{x}))^\alpha)^\flat \leftrightarrow \tau(\bar{x})$$

for all atomic formulas $\sigma(\bar{x})$ of \mathcal{L}_A and $\tau(\bar{x})$ of \mathcal{L}_\in . The details are routine; we make only a few comments on them here.

Note first that both interpretations preserve the logical symbols (they map domains to domains and do not alter equality); thus we need only look at nonlogical symbols.

To see $\alpha\beta = 1_{\text{PA}}$, work in PA and write $x <' y$ for $(x < y)^{(\text{ab})}$, $0'$ for the $<'$ -least number, $1'$ for the $<'$ -least number not equal to $0'$, $x +' y$ for the unique z such that $(x + y = z)^{(\text{ab})}$, and $x \cdot' y$ for the unique w such that $(x \cdot y = w)^{(\text{ab})}$. It can be checked that $0' = 0$, $1' = 1$, and $\forall x \ x + 1 = x +' 1'$, and by an induction on y this implies that $\forall x, y \ x + y = x +' y$. Since $x < y \leftrightarrow \exists z \ y = x + z + 1$ and $x <' y \leftrightarrow \exists z \ x = y +' z +' 1'$, it follows that $\forall x, y \ (x < y \leftrightarrow x <' y)$. Similarly, $x \cdot (y + 1) = (x \cdot y) + x$ and $x \cdot' (y +' 1') = (x \cdot' y) +' x$, so by induction on y we can show that $\forall x, y \ x \cdot y = x \cdot' y$, as required.

To see $\beta\alpha = 1_{\text{ZF-inf}^*}$, work in ZF-inf^* and write $x \in' y$ for $(x \in y)^{(\text{ba})}$. Then by \in -induction we may show $\forall x \forall y \ (x \in y \leftrightarrow x \in' y)$ and the result then follows. \square

7 Fragments of Arithmetic and Set Theory

As with many results for models of Peano arithmetic, the results presented above have hierarchical variations for subsystems of PA and ZF. It seems worthwhile to briefly survey what one can say about this here. Our results along these lines are not really new since they were essentially already worked out by Ressayre [14].

First, we fix a Δ_0 formula for $p = 2^x$ which defines a partial-function (formula (2) above), and for which the recursive definition (formula (1) above) and its “downward” version,

$$\forall x \forall p \ (p = 2^{x+1} \rightarrow \exists q \ (p = 2q \wedge q = 2^x)) \quad (3)$$

are all provable in $\text{I}\Delta_0$. This latter sentence appears necessary and more than just a convenience. But we cannot think of a natural example where the upward recursion holds but the downward one fails. However, the additional assumption is quite mild, for if a formula $\theta(x, y)$ for $y = 2^x$ satisfies (1) and (2) provably in $\text{I}\Delta_0$, then $\theta(x, y) \wedge \forall u < x \ \exists v < y \ \theta(u, v)$ satisfies (1), (2), and (3) provably in $\text{I}\Delta_0$, as the reader may check.

With such a definition of exponentiation chosen, the domain of definition of the exponentiation operation $y \mapsto 2^y$ is an initial segment of the model of $\text{I}\Delta_0$, necessarily closed under successor and addition, but not in general closed under multiplication. We can prove in $\text{I}\Delta_0$ that for each x there is a power of two, 2^y , that is greater than x , and in fact there is a least such power of two. With a slight misuse of notation we denote the least y such that $2^y > x$ by $\log x$.

It is fairly straightforward to see that $\text{I}\Delta_0$ proves the Ackermann interpretation of many set theory axioms including extensionality, empty set, sum set, foundation, transitive closure, and the negation of the axiom of infinity.

Adding the further arithmetic axiom exp , $\forall x \exists y \ y = 2^x$, stating the totality of the function $x \mapsto 2^x$ we may prove the Ackermann interpretation of the pair set axiom and the power set axiom. Moreover, exp is necessary as well as sufficient for these: to show $\text{I}\Delta_0 \vdash \text{Pair}^{\text{a}} \rightarrow \text{exp}$ and $\text{I}\Delta_0 \vdash \text{Pow}^{\text{a}} \rightarrow \text{exp}$, take a number y and 2^x , the smallest power of two greater than y . Then as 2^x codes the set $\{x\}$, by pair set or power set the set $\{\{x\}, \{\}\}$ must also be coded, and this code can only be $2^{2^x} + 1$. Thus 2^{2^x} exists and so therefore does 2^y .

To study the remaining axioms for set theory, we introduce a hierarchy of formulas related to Lévy's but more convenient for weak systems where the power set axiom may fail. Say a formula of the language of set theory is $\Delta_0^{\mathfrak{P}}$ if it is formed from atomic formulas by Boolean operations and bounded quantifiers of the form $\text{Q}x \in y \dots$ and $\text{Q}x \subseteq y \dots$. A formula is $\Sigma_n^{\mathfrak{P}}$ (respectively, $\Pi_n^{\mathfrak{P}}$) if it

is $\exists \bar{x}_1 \forall \bar{x}_2 \dots \mathbb{Q} \bar{x}_n \theta$ (respectively, $\forall \bar{x}_1 \exists \bar{x}_2 \dots \mathbb{Q}^* \bar{x}_n \theta$) where θ is $\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$. With a symbol for power set, the quantifier $\mathbb{Q}x \subseteq y \dots$ can be replaced by $\mathbb{Q}x \in \mathcal{P}(y) \dots$ and as the power set of a set x is Π_1 -definable (in the sense of Lévy) this means that the $\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}} / \Pi_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ hierarchy agrees with the Lévy hierarchy for $n \geq 2$ in the presence of the power set axiom.

With these definitions in place, we can readily prove by induction that $I\Delta_0$ proves the Ackermann interpretation of the $\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$ -separation axiom scheme, $\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Sep, and for $n \geq 1$, $I\Sigma_n$ proves both $\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Sep $^{\alpha}$ and $\Pi_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Sep $^{\alpha}$. Also, using the least number principle we have that $I\Delta_0$ proves $\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Ind $^{\alpha}$, the Ackermann interpretation of the $\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$ -epsilon induction axiom scheme

$$\forall \bar{a} (\forall y (\forall x \in y \theta(x, \bar{a}) \rightarrow \theta(y, \bar{a})) \rightarrow \forall y \theta(y, \bar{a}))$$

for θ in $\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$, and, similarly, $I\Sigma_n$ proves $\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Ind $^{\alpha}$ and $\Pi_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Ind $^{\alpha}$.

The collection and replacement axiom schemes are a little more delicate. Let $\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Coll be the scheme

$$\forall a, \bar{c} (\forall x \in a \exists y \theta(x, y, \bar{c}) \rightarrow \exists b \forall x \in a \exists y \in b \theta(x, y, \bar{c}))$$

for θ in $\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}}$, and so on. To justify the Ackermann interpretation of axioms like this, we need fast growing functions. For example, taking $a \supseteq \{l - 1\}$ where $l = \log a$ and letting $\theta(x, y)$ be the Δ_0 formula $y = \{x\}$ we trivially have $(\forall x \in a \exists y \theta(x, y))^{\alpha}$ in all models of $I\Delta_0$, but the code for any b with $(\exists b \forall x \in a \exists y \in b \theta(x, y))^{\alpha}$ must be at least as large as $2^{2^{l-1}} \approx 2^a$ so exponentiation is required. On the other hand, it is straightforward to see that $(\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Coll) $^{\alpha}$ is provable in $I\Delta_0 + \exp + B\Sigma_n$. Similar remarks apply to the replacement axioms, which we might as well take here to be

$$\forall a, \bar{c} (\forall x \in a \exists y \theta(x, y, \bar{c}) \rightarrow \exists f \forall x \in a \theta(x, f(x), \bar{c})).$$

Then $(\Sigma_n^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Rep) $^{\alpha}$ is provable in $I\Sigma_n$, for each $n \geq 1$, but for $n = 0$ the best result seems to be $I\Delta_0 + \exp + B\Sigma_1 \vdash (\Delta_0^{\mathcal{P}}$ -Rep) $^{\alpha}$.

The inverse \mathfrak{b} to the Ackermann interpretation is a somewhat more complicated affair, and we make no effort here to even attempt to say what happens here in the absence of the axioms corresponding to exponentiation, namely, pair set and power set. We shall simply state our results, which are based on a straightforward but rather tedious analysis of the proofs given in Sections 4, 5, and 6, and leave the verification to the reader. (The presentation of Kripke-Platek set theory given in Chapter 1 of Barwise [3] may be found helpful.) It turns out that for the results that follow, the usual Lévy hierarchy (where bounded quantifiers take the form $\mathbb{Q}x \in y \dots$ only) gives the sharpest result. We denote the levels in this hierarchy by Δ_n^L , Σ_n^L , and Π_n^L .

The first stage is to define the ordinals, in particular, the arithmetic structure on the ordinals, and to define the bijection $\mathfrak{p}: V \rightarrow \text{On}$ between the universe and the ordinals. We take as our base theory the set theory consisting of the axioms of extensionality, empty set, sum set, and the negation of the axiom of infinity, and the axiom schemes of Δ_0^L -separation, Δ_0^L -collection, and both Σ_1^L -epsilon induction and Π_1^L -epsilon induction. With this base theory, the class of ordinals is defined (as the transitive sets linearly ordered by \in) by a Δ_0^L formula, and the arithmetic operations on the ordinals including $+$, \times , \exp are all functions with Δ_1^L graph. Moreover, the scheme of Σ_1^L -induction proves the axiom of foundation and the axiom of transitive containment, and hence we may define the bijection $\mathfrak{p}: V \rightarrow \text{On}$, also with Δ_1^L graph, and that this map is inverse to the Ackermann interpretation of sets from the

ordinals. The base axioms for arithmetic, that is, the axioms for nonnegative parts of discretely ordered rings, can then be shown to hold in the ordinals.

To prove the induction scheme we need somewhat stronger axioms showing that the ordinals satisfy $I\Sigma_n$, and so on. Perhaps the simplest option is to take stronger instances of the separation scheme. Given a Σ_n -definable subclass A of the ordinals containing 0 and closed under successor, and given $n \in \text{On}$, let a be the set of ordinals in A less than n , by Σ_n^L -separation. Then by ordinal induction $a = n$ so, as n was arbitrary, $A = \text{On}$.

Putting all this together, we have the following.

Theorem 7.1 *Let $n \geq 1$ and let $\Sigma_n^L\text{-Sep}$ denote the set theory consisting of Σ_n^L -separation together with base theory Ext , Emp , Sum , $\neg\text{Inf}$, $\Delta_0^L\text{-Coll}$, $\Sigma_1^L\text{-Ind}$, and $\Pi_1^L\text{-Ind}$. Then the Ackermann interpretation α and its inverse \flat are defined for $I\Sigma_n$ and $\Sigma_n^L\text{-Sep}$, with*

$$\alpha: \Sigma_n^L\text{-Sep} \rightarrow I\Sigma_n$$

and

$$\flat: I\Sigma_n \rightarrow \Sigma_n^L\text{-Sep}$$

and these are inverse to each other. □

Thus, the Ackermann interpretation behaves well for the “traditional” subtheories $I\Sigma_n$ of PA. For weaker theories the pair set and power set axioms behave like the axiom exp expressing the totality of exponentiation.

To close this section, we should remark that for systems of arithmetic without exp , there are other choices of interpretations of set theory. The Ackermann interpretation is of course valid, and in some sense represents the smallest collection of sets or smallest model of set theory one might take, but we could transform a model M of $I\Delta_0$ to a different model of set theory by taking as sets all *bounded Δ_0 -definable subsets of M* , and identifying an $a \in M$ with the set of $x \in M$ such that $M \models (x \in a)^\alpha$. In the (apparent) absence of a formalized notion of truth for Δ_0 formulas in $I\Delta_0$ (this itself an open problem) this does not appear to be an interpretation in the formal sense used above. It is essentially the approach taken by Diaconescu and Kirby [5] and, as they point out, counting principles and pigeonhole principles become highly relevant. (It is still not known if $I\Delta_0$ alone can prove the pigeonhole principle for Δ_0 functions.) Of course, if $M \models \text{exp}$ this interpretation and the Ackermann one coincide since

$$I\Delta_0 + \text{exp} \vdash \forall a \exists y \forall x < a ((x \in y)^\alpha \leftrightarrow \theta(x))$$

for each Δ_0 formula $\theta(x)$, possibly with further parameters.

8 Conclusions for Finite Set Theories and Arithmetic

Perhaps the first and most obvious conclusion is that statements concerning the equivalence of “Peano Arithmetic” and “ZF with the axiom of infinity negated” require some care to formulate and prove. It is certainly true that PA and “ZF with the axiom of infinity negated” are equiconsistent for just about any sensible axiomatization of the latter, in the sense that interpretations exist in both directions. Probably this is the “folklore result” that most people remember. But for the finer result with interpretations inverse to each other, careful axiomatization of the set theory

is required. A category theoretic framework for interpretations is useful to direct attention to these refinements.

The reader will have noticed that the axiom of choice (AC) has been completely absent from the discussion here. It wasn't necessary at all for the inverse Ackermann interpretation, though it comes for free with the Ackermann interpretation itself: $\alpha: \text{ZF-inf}^* + \text{AC} \rightarrow \text{PA}$. This shows $\text{ZF-inf}^* \vdash \text{AC}$. In fact, AC can be proved in much less than this, as Baratella and Ferro [2] point out.

The universe of hereditarily finite sets has been an important source of analogies, inspiration, and axioms for set theory with infinite sets from the time of Cantor onward. In the case of the work here we have learned that models of ZF-inf^* are categorical with respect to their ordinals in the sense that the model of set theory can be reconstructed from the ordinals as a model of arithmetic. The analogous case for models of full ZF is a result due to Friedman [7] that characterizes $\text{ZF} + V=L$ as the first-order theory extending ZF in which any two models with the same ordinals are isomorphic. (See Friedman's paper for a precise statement of this result.)

Results like this provide evidence that models of ZF in which $V=L$ holds are actually the "uninteresting" models of ZF, and a similar remark holds for models of finite set theory too. Arguably, the uninteresting models of ZF-inf are the ones in which the axiom of transitive containment holds, and the interesting ones are those for which TC fails. It would be nice to know more about such models, but very few have appeared in the literature. Note that every model M of ZF-inf has a transitive submodel $V \subseteq M$, $V \models \text{ZF-inf} + \text{TC}$, with the same ordinals, defined to be the image of the function $f: \text{On} \rightarrow V$ given by the recursion on ordinals

$$f(x) = \{f(y) : \text{On} \models (y \in x)^\alpha\}.$$

One way to think about the submodel $V \subseteq M$ is that this is the collection of sets in M with a rank; that is, they are the sets in the cumulative hierarchy. (Hence the name V we have used for this submodel.)

Whether the theory of models with $M \neq V$ will have any consequence for arithmetic itself is not clear, as the ordinals in models of $\text{ZF-inf} + \neg\text{TC}$ are, of course, just the usual models of PA.

Finite set theories in which the axiom of power set fails are an altogether more difficult proposition—apparently for some very good reasons possibly related to the coding problems and complexity theory issues one gets with models of arithmetic without exponentiation.

It is not quite clear to us exactly how this might arise from the point of view of the Ackermann interpretation considered here. However, one view of the inverse Ackermann interpretation in a model M of some fragment of finite set theory is that it sets out to define suitable arithmetic structure for $+$ and \cdot on the whole universe of sets, in a way that is compatible with the Ackermann interpretation that maps ordinals to sets in the cumulative hierarchy $V \subseteq M$. (V will in general be a subclass of the class of all sets because the transitive containment axiom may fail in M .) But it is clear that if one did have a general process for achieving this, or even for defining $+$ and \cdot on a significant part of the whole universe, this arithmetic model would have to be an end-extension of the image of the ordinals given by the Ackermann interpretation.

Such a general method for producing end-extensions of models of arithmetic might be very significant for models of $I\Delta_0 + \neg \text{exp}$. There are several open questions concerning when models of $I\Delta_0 + \neg \text{exp}$ have end-extensions [17]. More significantly, success in the naïve attempt at producing an inverse Ackermann interpretation would give end-extensions $M \subseteq_e K$ of $M \models I\Delta_0 + \neg \text{exp}$ where each element $x \in M$ has an exponential $y = 2^x \in K$. Such a construction might be applied in the case when the model of finite set theory is of the type studied by Diaconescu and Kirby [5], that is formed from Δ_0 -definable bounded subsets. This would in turn have consequences for the Π_1 -theory of the base model M . In particular, this would have consequences for the Π_1 -theory provable in $I\Delta_0$ with a single application of exponentiation. This Π_1 -theory contains some statements not known in $I\Delta_0$ itself such as the Δ_0 pigeonhole principle, and also contains consistency statements such as the tableau consistency of \mathcal{Q} , known not to be provable in $I\Delta_0$ alone. (See, for example, papers by Pudlák [13] and Paris and Wilkie [16] for much more information.)

Finally, leaving arithmetic aside, the Axiom of Choice becomes interesting for systems of finite set theory that do not have the power set axiom. Apparently power set is required for the equivalence of the well-ordering principle (WO) and AC, though $\text{WO} \rightarrow \text{AC}$ can be proved by the usual proof without power set. However, we were unable to find a model of $\text{AC} + \neg \text{WO}$. Using the notation of Baratella and Ferro introduced above, we can ask the following.

Question 8.1 Does $\text{EST} + \neg \text{Inf} + \text{Found} \vdash \text{AC}$?

Note that, as Baratella and Ferro point out, $\text{EST} + \neg \text{Inf} + \text{Pow} \vdash \text{WO}$ by a straightforward argument mapping sets bijectively onto ordinals. They also provide a model of $\text{EST} + \neg \text{Inf} + \neg \text{WO}$.

Note

1. The axiom scheme of separation is redundant in the presence of replacement.

References

- [1] Ackermann, W., “Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der allgemeinen Mengenlehre,” *Mathematische Annalen*, vol. 114 (1937), pp. 305–15. Zbl 0016.19501. MR 1513141. 499
- [2] Baratella, S., and R. Ferro, “A theory of sets with the negation of the axiom of infinity,” *Mathematical Logic Quarterly*, vol. 39 (1993), pp. 338–52. Zbl 0807.03031. MR 1270381. 499, 502, 507
- [3] Barwise, J., *Admissible Sets and Structures: An Approach to Definability Theory*, Perspectives in Mathematical Logic, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1975. Zbl 0316.02047. MR 0424560. 505
- [4] Chang, C. C., and H. J. Keisler, *Model Theory*, 2d edition, vol. 73 of *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics*, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1977. Zbl 0276.02032. MR 0532927. 498
- [5] Diaconescu, R., and L. A. S. Kirby, “Models of arithmetic and categories with finiteness conditions,” *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, vol. 35 (1987), pp. 123–48. Zbl 0635.03058. MR 897386. 506, 508

- [6] Drake, F. R., *Set Theory: An Introduction to Large Cardinals*, vol. 76 of *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics*, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1974. Zbl 0294.02034. 498, 500, 501
- [7] Friedman, H., “Categoricity with respect to ordinals,” pp. 17–20 in *Higher Set Theory (Proceedings of the Conference, Mathematisches Forschungsinstitut (Oberwolfach, 1977))*, edited by G. H. Müller and D. S. Scott, vol. 669 of *Lecture Notes in Mathematics*, Springer, Berlin, 1978. Zbl 0395.03035. MR 520182. MR 520185. 507
- [8] Gaifman, H., and C. Dimitracopoulos, “Fragments of Peano’s arithmetic and the MRDP theorem,” pp. 187–206 in *Logic and Algorithmic (Zurich, 1980)*, vol. 30 of *Monographies de L’Enseignement Mathématique*, Université de Genève, Geneva, 1982. Zbl 0498.03045. MR 648303. 500
- [9] Hájek, P., and P. Pudlák, *Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic*, Perspectives in Mathematical Logic, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993. Zbl 0781.03047. MR 1219738. 500
- [10] Kaye, R., *Models of Peano Arithmetic*, vol. 15 of *Oxford Logic Guides*, The Clarendon Press, New York, 1991. Zbl 0744.03037. MR 1098499. 498
- [11] Kunen, K., *Set Theory: An Introduction to Independence Proofs*, vol. 102 of *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics*, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980. Zbl 0443.03021. MR 597342. 502
- [12] Mancini, A., and D. Zambella, “A note on recursive models of set theories,” *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. 42 (2001), pp. 109–15. Zbl 1031.03062. MR 1993394. 501
- [13] Pudlák, P., “Cuts, consistency statements and interpretations,” *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, vol. 50 (1985), pp. 423–41. Zbl 0569.03024. MR 793123. 508
- [14] Ressayre, J.-P., “Modèles non standard et sous-systèmes remarquables de ZF,” pp. 47–147 in *Modèles non Standard en Arithmétique et théorie des Ensembles*, vol. 22 of *Publications Mathématiques de l’Université Paris VII*, Université de Paris VII U.E.R. de Mathématiques, Paris, 1987. Zbl 0631.03048. MR 882182. 504
- [15] Visser, A., “Categories of theories and interpretations,” pp. 284–341 in *Logic in Tehran. Proceedings of the Workshop and Conference on Logic, Algebra, and Arithmetic, (October, 2003)*, edited by A. Enayat, I. Kalantari, and M. Moniri, vol. 26 of *Lecture Notes in Logic*, Association for Symbolic Logic, La Jolla, 2006. Logic Group Preprint Series 228, Faculteit Wijsbegeerte, Universiteit Utrecht, <http://www.phil.uu.nl/preprints/preprints/PREPRINTS/preprint228.pdf>. Zbl 1094.03004. Zbl 1107.03066. MR 2262326. 498
- [16] Wilkie, A. J., and J. B. Paris, “On the scheme of induction for bounded arithmetic formulas,” *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic*, vol. 35 (1987), pp. 261–302. Zbl 0647.03046. MR 904326. 508
- [17] Wilkie, A. J., and J. B. Paris, “On the existence of end extensions of models of bounded induction,” pp. 143–61 in *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, VIII (Moscow, 1987)*, edited by J. E. Fenstad, I. T. Frolov, and R. Hilpinen, vol. 126 of *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics*, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1989. Zbl 0695.03019. MR 1034554. MR 1034559. 508

School of Mathematics
University of Birmingham
Birmingham
B15 2TT
UNITED KINGDOM
R.W.Kaye@bham.ac.uk
wongtl@maths.bham.ac.uk