A CONTRIBUTION TO KIEFER'S THEORY OF CONDITIONAL CONFIDENCE PROCEDURES

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The "procedures" discussed in this paper are of the following type: The statistician makes a conventional decision (in a multiple decision problem). He also provides a statement of the guaranteed conditional probability that his decision will be correct, given the observed value of some conditioning random variable. Various admissibility criteria to relate such procedures are proposed. For example, we say that one procedure is better (first sense) than a second if the guaranteed conditional confidence statement using the first is stochastically larger than that using the second, for all possible states of nature. Some ramifications of these admissibility criteria are discussed, and some specific admissible procedures are described for problems with two possible states of nature. In particular, the procedure having the finest possible monotone conditioning and having equal conditional confidence under both states of nature is shown to have many desirable admissibility properties.

1. Introduction. A "conditional confidence procedure" involves a conventional decision procedure and a conditioning random variable. The decision procedures to be considered here are multiple decision (classification) procedures. This is the interpretation given in Kiefer [3]: the statistician makes the conventional decision called for on the basis of the observed random sample. He *also* provides a conditional statement concerning the probability of a correct decision given the observed value of the conditioning random variable, and given each of the possible states of nature. Such procedures are introduced in Kiefer ([2], [3]) and form an essential part of Kiefer's theory.

Both these papers, especially [3], also describe certain partial orderings (notions of betterness) among such conditional decision procedures and discuss the nature of the admissible procedures under these orderings. These partial orderings are based on certain stochastic properties of the conditional confidence statement.

However, the conditional confidence statements described in [3] depend on the true, *but unknown*, state of nature. For many plausible applications such a conditional confidence statement is inappropriate. A statement is required which is not dependent on the unknown state of nature. In this paper we instead suggest as a conditional statement the *guaranteed conditional confidence*, which is the infimum over all states of nature of this conditional confidence (given the value of the conditioning random variable). Following this, some plausible admissibility criteria for such procedures are introduced in Sections 3–5. Example 5.1

presents what we feel is a strong case for the use of one of our criteria in a particular type of classification problem.

One feature shared by our various admissibility criteria is that the admissible procedures are always conditionally maxmin—that is, for each given value of the conditioning variable the procedure maximizes the minimum probability of a correct decision. This feature is discussed in more detail in Section 6. It is described there how this implies that the admissibility criteria operate on the conditioning rules of various procedures, and that certain conditioning rules are better than others. Such a situation is qualitatively different than the one exposed in [3] and [2] for the type of confidence statements and admissibility criteria developed there. (See e.g. [3, Theorem 3.1].) The simple two-parameter point problem is then discussed in the last section of this paper. Some reasonable, admissible procedures are described, corresponding to the different admissibility criteria proposed. This simple problem does have some possible plausible applications. (See the classification example in Section 5.) However these applications alone are not the main justification for the detailed results which appear in this section of the paper. Rather, we feel that these results are a first step toward similar results in more realistic multiple decision settings, involving larger parameter spaces. Also, this careful investigation of such simple problems has deepened our understanding of the criteria proposed in this paper, and we hope the reader will find a similar benefit.

2. Basic notation. Consider a statistical problem in abstract form—a measure space $\mathscr{X}$, $\mathscr{B}$ and a set of possible probability distributions, $\{F_\omega : \omega \in \Omega\}$, on $\mathscr{X}$, $\mathscr{B}$.

A nonrandomized confidence procedure, δ, in Kiefer's theory consists of a decision rule, say β, making decisions in a space $\mathscr{D}$; and a $\mathscr{B}$-measurable conditioning random variable, Z, taking values in $\mathscr{X}$, $\mathscr{B}_{\mathscr{X}}$ (or its associated σ-field, $\mathscr{B}_0 \subset \mathscr{B}$). [In [2] and [3] the critical regions of the decision rule, β, are often referred to as the "$\mathscr{C}^1$ partition" of the procedure δ, and written as $|\delta|$. That terminology is not used here.]

Let D_ω denote those decisions which are correct for ω. For a given procedure consider

$$(2.1) \qquad\qquad \Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(z) = \mathrm{Pr}_\omega\left(\beta \in D_\omega \mid Z = z\right).$$

This (measurable) function—which depends also on ω—is fundamental in the theory. [In the nonrandomized case discussed here Γ may also be thought of as a function of x, defined by $\Gamma(Z(x))$ in the above notation. However, because Γ is written above as a function of z, certain expressions in Section 3 are valid also in the case of randomized conditioning rules (as described in [3, Section 4]). In particular the optimality assertions and the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are valid within the class of all randomized rules.]

If it were possible, it would be desirable to have $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(z)$ large for all ω, z. Since this is not possible it is necessary to compare different procedures by

considering some sort of notion of goodness in which "larger" Γ's are better (larger in some appropriate sense).

As noted in the introduction the statement $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(z)$ may depend on ω for given δ, z. It may therefore not be an appropriate summary statement, or estimate, of the statistician's conditional confidence in the rule β, given $Z = z$. A better summary statement is the *guaranteed conditional confidence*, defined by

$$(2.2) \qquad \kappa_\delta(z) = \inf_{\omega \in \Omega} \Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(z) \, .$$

TECHNICAL COMMENTS. The simple expression in (2.2) ignores two significant technical issues.

First, the heuristics of the situation demand that $\kappa_\delta(z)$ should not be influenced by values of $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(z)$ for which ω is a posteriori "impossible" given $Z = z$. But since $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}$ is defined as a conditional expectation, its value is arbitrary at such values of ω, z (subject only to measurability restrictions). An added convention is required to guarantee that $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}$ is taken to be large for such impossible values of ω so that the infimum on the right of (2.2) is not affected by such values. This convention is described below.

CONVENTION 2.1. Let $F_\omega \ll \nu$ (or, more generally, $F_\omega^Z \ll \nu^Z$) for all $\omega \in \Omega$, with $\nu(\nu^Z)$ σ finite. Let f_ω^Z denote some fixed version of $dF_\omega^Z/d\nu^Z$ and let $S_\omega = \{z \in \mathscr{X}: f_\omega^Z > 0\}$. By convention, always set $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(z) = 1$ if $z \notin S_\omega$.

This convention, possibly in conjunction with (2.2'), below, will serve to guarantee that κ is essentially uniquely defined a.e. (ν); and that conditionally "impossible" values of ω (i.e. $\{\omega: z \notin S_\omega\}$) influence κ only on a ν-null set.

Note that the dominatedness assumption in the above convention is a fortiori satisfied if either Ω or $\mathscr{X}$ is countable. We do not know how to proceed in general if Ω and $\mathscr{X}$ are both uncountable and $\{F_\omega^Z : \omega \in \Omega\}$ is not a dominated family.

Most conditional confidence problems involve finite or countable, decision spaces. In that case (2.2) and Convention 2.1 serve to define κ_δ uniquely a.e. (ν^Z). On the other hand, if the decision space is uncountable, and $\mathscr{X}$ is also uncountable, then different determinations of the $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}$, $\omega \in \Omega$, may lead to essentially different determinations of κ_δ. In that case (again assuming that $F_\omega^Z \ll \nu^Z$, $\omega \in \Omega$) the most satisfactory course is to replace (2.2) by

$$(2.2') \qquad \kappa_\delta' = \text{ess inf}_{\omega \in \Omega} \Gamma_{\omega,\delta}$$

where the "ess. inf." is taken relative to the measure ν^Z. (That is to say, $\kappa_\delta'(\cdot) \leqq \Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(\cdot)$ a.e. ν^Z $\forall$ ω, and if g satisfies $g(\cdot) \leqq \Gamma_{\omega,\delta}(\cdot)$ a.e. ν^Z $\forall$ ω then $g(\cdot) \leqq \kappa_\delta'(\cdot)$ a.e. ν^Z.) This definition, together with Convention 2.1, serves to uniquely define κ_δ' (a.e. ν^Z). Further conditions are required in order that κ_δ' may be computed conditionally from suitable versions of $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta}$, $\omega \in \Omega$—that is, in order that $\kappa_\delta' = \kappa_\delta$. Such conditions can often be provided by restricting attention to certain "smooth" (e.g. continuous) versions of the conditional probabilities.

3. **First admissibility criterion.** The first notion of goodness (admissibility criterion) we propose is as follows:

Let

$$(3.1) \qquad Q_{\omega,\delta}(r) = \Pr_{\omega}(\kappa_{\delta} \leqq r).$$

Then we say that δ_1 is better than δ_2 (first sense) if κ_{δ_1} is stochastically larger than κ_{δ_2} for every ω. In more formal terms this reads—δ_2 is *inadmissible* (*first sense*) if there is a procedure δ_1 for which

$$(3.2) \qquad Q_{\omega,\delta_1}(r) \leqq Q_{\omega,\delta_2}(r) \qquad \text{for all} \quad \omega, \quad r$$

with strict inequality for some ω, r.

To justify this notion note first that in any experiment the value of ω is unknown. Hence κ_{δ} is the best possible conservative estimate of the conditional probability of making a correct decision, given the value of the conditioning variable, Z. The experimenter would like to work things out so that his guaranteed conditional confidence will be stochastically large. This leads to the admissibility criterion expressed in (3.2), above.

The formal admissibility criteria in [3] are very different. Nevertheless the discussion there contains a considerable emphasis on describing and discussing procedures in which for each $x \in \mathscr{X}$ $\Gamma_{\omega}(Z(x))$ is approximately constant as ω ranges over Ω. See especially [2, Section 1] and [3, Sections 1.1 and 6D]. We believe that this emphasis is due in large part to the feeling that the relevant quantity in many applications is really κ_{δ} (instead of merely Γ_{ω}), for the reason mentioned above. [Note that, $\kappa_{\delta}(\cdot)$ is symbolically defined (by $\psi(\cdot)$) in [3, Section 1.1].]

Observe that (3.2) is equivalent to

$$(3.3) \qquad \int h(r) \, dQ_{\omega,\delta_1}(r) \geqq \int h(r) \, dQ_{\omega,\delta_2}(r)$$

for all nondecreasing h and all ω, with strict inequality for some h, ω.

There is a further relation between the above admissibility criterion and those defined in [3]. Suppose δ_1 and δ_2 are two procedures each having $\Gamma_{\omega,\delta_i}(z)$ constant for each fixed z. (Hence $\kappa_{\delta_i} = \Gamma_{\omega,\delta_i}$, $\omega \in \Omega$.) It is noted above that such procedures are recommended in the discussion in [2] and [3]; and it will be described in Section 6 that our admissibility criteria invariably lead to the use of such procedures. Then, Kiefer's first admissibility criterion (see [3 (2.4)]) states that δ_1 is better than δ_2 if and only if our (3.3) holds for all h of the form $h(r) = r\chi_{r \geqq R}(r)$, $0 \leqq R \leqq 1$. For δ_i as above, the other admissibility criterion of Kiefer's development (see [3 (2.6)]) is equivalent to: δ_1 is better than δ_2 if and only if our (3.3) holds for all h of the form $h(r) = r$ for $r < R$, $= 1$ for $r \geqq R$. Therefore, *among the class of procedures having* $\kappa_{\delta} = \Gamma_{\omega,\delta}$, $\omega \in \Omega$, our notion of admissibility (first sense) is slightly weaker than the notion referred to in Kiefer's paper [3] as "admissibility in the sense (2.4) (2.6)." See also [3, Section 6D].

4. Second admissibility criterion. There is another relevant point raised in [2] and [3]. It is argued that, other features being equal, a large variation in Γ_{ω} is desirable. (See, for example [3, Section 0].) Because of our previous arguments we would translate this into a principle concerning κ. To place this

argument in more concrete terms consider the following simplified example. Suppose there are two procedures δ_1 and δ_2 and that their associated functions satisfy

$$
\begin{aligned}
Q_{\omega,\delta_2}(r) &= 0 \quad r < \tfrac{3}{4} \\
&= 1 \quad r \geq \tfrac{3}{4} \qquad\qquad \text{for all } \omega
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
Q_{\omega,\delta_1}(r) &= 0 \quad r < \tfrac{1}{2} \\
&= \tfrac{1}{2} \quad \tfrac{1}{2} \leq r < 1 \\
&= 1 \quad r = 1 \qquad\qquad \text{for all } \omega .
\end{aligned}
$$

(Thus, for all ω, under δ_2 the random variable κ is $\tfrac{3}{4}$ with probability 1, and under δ_1 it is $\tfrac{1}{2}$ and 1 with equal probability.) Neither procedure would dominate the other in the sense of (3.2). If, in addition, both procedures have constant $\Gamma_{\cdot,\delta}(z)$ for each z then they both have $\Pr_\omega$ (correct decision) $= \Pr_\omega(D_\omega) = \tfrac{3}{4}$ for all ω and so they are equally good unconditionally. However the consideration alluded to above would indicate that δ_1 is preferable to δ_2.

Suppose this consideration is accepted by the experimenter as reflecting his goals for the conditional confidence procedure. Then it indicates as a principle that δ_2 is *inadmissible (second sense)* if there is another procedure δ_1 with

(4.1)
$$
\int h(r)\, dQ_{\omega,\delta_1}(r) \geqq \int h(r)\, dQ_{\omega,\delta_2}(r)
$$

for all nondecreasing, *convex* h and all ω, with strict inequality for some ω and some nondecreasing convex h.

PROPOSITION 4.1. *Admissibility (second sense) implies admissibility (first sense).*

PROOF. Suppose δ_2 is inadmissible (first sense). Then there exists a δ_1 such that $Q_{\omega,\delta_1}(r) \leqq Q_{\omega,\delta_2}(r)$ for all ω, r with strict inequality for some ω, r, say for ω', r'. It follows from (3.3) that (4.1) holds for all nondecreasing convex h and all ω. It remains to show that there is an appropriate pair ω, h such that strict inequality holds in (4.1).

Suppose $r' = 1$. Then strict inequality holds in (4.1) for $\omega = \omega'$ and $h(t) = \chi_{\{1\}}(t)$, which is convex on $[0, 1]$. If $r' \neq 1$ then choose $\omega = \omega'$ and $h(r) = (r - r')^+$. Then $\int_{r'}^1 (1 - Q(r))\, dr = \int h(r)\, dQ(r)$ for any cdf Q on $[0, 1]$. It follows from this (and the right continuity of Q) that $\int h(r)\, dQ_{\omega',\delta_1}(r) > \int h(r)\, dQ_{\omega,\delta_2}(r)$.

5. Third admissibility criterion. Both of the above criteria reflect only a vague assessment of goals by the experimenter. When these goals can be refined they result in a third, more precise, criterion. Observe that the function h which appears in (3.3) and (4.1) plays the role of a gain function. The value of $h(r)$ can be thought of as representing the "gain", ("satisfaction", etc.) to the experimenter from making a statement with guaranteed conditional confidence r. Then

(5.1)
$$
\int h(r)\, dQ_{\omega,\delta}(r) = E_\omega(h(\kappa_\delta(z))) = B_h(\omega, \delta)
$$

is the expected gain (to be called *benefit*) resulting from the procedure δ. The admissibility principles embodied in (3.3) and (4.1) state in this interpretation

that a procedure is inadmissible if another procedure has benefit at least as great for all ω no matter what gain function, h, is used among those in a wide class (increasing functions for (3.3) and increasing convex ones for (4.1)). [This kind of "robustness" in the gain function is analogous to the robustness in the loss function considered in Brown [1] for estimating normal means.]

Suppose, however, the experimenter can settle on a single nondecreasing gain function, h, to correspond to his goals in performing the experiment. Then his ranking of procedures takes on the traditional decision theoretic structure: a procedure δ_2 is *inadmissible relative to a given gain function*, h, if there is another procedure δ_1 such that

(5.2) $$B_h(\omega, \delta_1) \geqq B_h(\omega, \delta_2) \qquad \text{for all} \quad \omega \in \Omega$$

with strict inequality for some ω.

[The structure here is "traditional" in the sense of being based on a single real-valued function, B. It is of course really the negative of the usual theory in that it is based on gain and benefit instead of loss and risk.]

It is now also possible to describe a property stronger than second sense admissibility. Suppose that for each nondecreasing convex h, δ is admissible relative to h. Then we say that δ is *totally admissible* (second sense). ("Total admissibility (first sense)" could be similarly defined, but the definition appears to be barren; in certain simple examples where we have investigated this property it appears that there do not exist any nontrivial totally admissible (first sense) procedures.)

Minimax (or, rather, maxmin) notions can also be defined. Two useful notions are as follows: δ_1 is called *maxmin relative to h* if

(5.3) $$\min_{\omega \in \Omega} B_h(\omega, \delta_1) = \max_\delta \min_{\omega \in \Omega} B_h(\omega, \delta) .$$

δ_1 is called *totally maxmin (second sense)* if it is maxmin relative to h for each nondecreasing convex h. Theorem 7.2 describes a totally admissible and totally maxmin procedure (second sense) for a special type of simple confidence problem.

The considerations alluded to in discussing the second sense of admissibility indicate that in many situations an experimenter who settles on a single gain function, h, will choose h to be convex. An intuitively appealing choice for h is $h(r) = r^2$. Under this choice of h, if two procedures have the same expected guaranteed confidence unconditionally—that is if

$$\int r \, dQ_{\omega, \delta_1}(r) = \int r \, dQ_{\omega, \delta_2}(r)$$

for all ω—then the procedure with the larger variance of the guaranteed conditional confidence for all ω (if there is such a procedure) will be the better procedure. [These considerations might also motivate one to adopt a variant of the above admissibility criterion in certain situations, and to base admissibility on only the two benefit functions B_{h_1} and B_{h_2} where $h_i = r^i$.]

However, convex gain functions are not always appropriate. Consider the following example in which a nonconvex gain function is clearly called for.

EXAMPLE 5.1. Consider a simple (nonBayesian) classification situation in which two types of items are produced. They are labelled by $\omega = 0$ and $\omega = 1$. A given item cannot be directly tested to check which type it is but some supplementary related characteristic(s), X, can be measured. X has known distribution F_ω. Items which can be classified as $\omega = 0$ or $\omega = 1$ with confidence, c, say, may be sold as "classified items" at a (premium) per item price, p. Those items which cannot be so classified must be sold in mixed lots at a lower per item price, say q. It follows that the appropriate gain function to the producer of these items is

$$h(r) = q \quad r < c$$
$$= p \quad r \geqq c.$$

There exists an optimal conditional confidence procedure for such a gain function. It is described in Theorem 7.1.

[Note the symmetry in the above formulation. As given the formulation guarantees, for example, that if a buyer purchases only those items which are offered at the premium price and *if* $\omega = i$ then at least $100c\%$ of such items will be classified as $\omega = i$; for both $i = 0, 1$. One might instead wish to require that under these two conditions a proportion c_i of such items will be classified as of type i, with $c_0 \neq c_1$. Although the formulation of confidence problems which is described in this note is specifically symmetrical, beginning with the definition (2.2) of κ, this asymmetrical situation can be formulated and discussed in a manner similar to the considerations here.]

6. Importance of the conditioning rule. One surprising (and disappointing) consequence of the notions of admissibility adopted in [3] is that admissibility of a procedure rarely, if ever, depends on the choice of conditioning variable (or subfield). In fact, in any two-parameter problem a procedure is admissible if and only if the decision rule β is unconditionally admissible, irrespective of the conditioning variable used. (See especially [3, Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 5.3] or [2, Theorem 3.1].)

The situation is diametrically different for the criteria we have suggested. Here, for each conditioning random variable, Z, there is usually a best decision rule—say β_Z. Since the value(s) of B_h, on the basis of which admissibility is judged, depend on (β_Z, Z), they are ultimately a function only of the conditioning rule described by Z. These admissibility criteria therefore operate in a nontrivial way on conditioning rules (together with their associated "best" decision rules). The construction of this "best" rule β_Z is sketched below.

Assume the existence for each $\omega \in \Omega$ of a regular conditional distribution on $\mathscr{X}$ given Z. Thus for each value of Z, $\{F_\omega(\cdot \mid z): \omega \in \Omega\}$ is a family of probability distributions on $\mathscr{X}, \mathscr{B}$. Now, for each fixed $z \in \mathscr{X}$ consider the statistical decision problem with these distributions $F_\omega(\cdot \mid z)$ and with gain function $G(d, \omega) = \chi_{D_\omega}(d)$. (Actually, if the F_ω do not have identical supports then $G(d, \omega)$ should be defined as $\chi_{D_\omega}(d)$ if $z \in S_\omega$ and 1 if $z \notin S_\omega$. See the Technical Comments

in Section 2.) Let $\beta(\cdot \mid z)$ denote the maxmin procedure for this conditional problem. $\beta(\cdot \mid z)$ may be randomized but that possibility requires no special handling in what follows. (If $\{F_\omega(\cdot \mid z) : \omega \in \Omega\}$ is a dominated family then the existence of $\beta(\cdot \mid z)$ is guaranteed by results in Le Cam [4].) (If $F_\omega \ll \nu$, $\omega \in \Omega$ and the regular conditional distribution of ν exists, then $F_\omega(\cdot \mid \cdot)$ may be taken so that $F_\omega(\cdot \mid z) \ll \nu(\cdot \mid z)$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$, $z \in \mathscr{X}$.)

Define $\beta_Z(x) = \beta(x \mid Z(x))$, *assuming* it is a *measurable* decision rule. The following is the desired result.

PROPOSITION. *Assume β_Z exists. Let $\delta_Z = (\beta_Z, Z)$ and let δ' be any other procedure with the same conditioning random variable Z. Then $Q_{\omega, \delta_Z}(r) \leqq Q_{\omega, \delta'}(r)$ for all ω, r. It follows that δ_Z is at least as good as δ' in any of the three senses of admissibility described above.*

PROOF. Consider any procedure $\delta'(\beta', Z)$ with conditioning random variable Z. Then Γ_ω is defined by $\Gamma_\omega(z) = \Pr\{\delta \in D_\omega \mid z\} = E(G(\beta, \omega) \mid z)$. Hence $\kappa(z)$ is maximized by choosing β at $Z(x) = z$ so as to maximize $\min_{\omega \in \Omega} E_\omega(G(\beta, \omega) \mid z)$. Since β_Z does precisely this, it follows that $\kappa_{\omega, \delta_Z}(Z(x)) \geqq \kappa_{\omega, \delta'}(Z(x))$ for all x. The claimed relation between the cumulative distribution functions of $\kappa_{\omega, \delta_Z}$ and of $\kappa_{\omega, \delta'}$ follows immediately.

7. Admissibility in two-point parameter spaces. This section contains some theorems and examples involving the simplest type of conditional confidence problem—for a two point parameter space in which $\Omega = \{0, 1\}$, $D = \{0, 1\}$, and $D_\omega = \omega$. In such a situation let $F_\omega \ll \nu$ and $f_\omega = dF_\omega/d\nu$; $\omega = 0, 1$. [Some of the following results require the use of truly randomized procedures. But these procedures all have a relatively simple structure so we have not felt it necessary to introduce the general terminology from [3, Section 4].]

The first result concerns the situation described in Example 5.1. It describes the admissible (third sense) procedures relative to a given gain function of the form $h(r) = \chi_{\{r \geqq c\}}(r)$. (Note that here $B_\omega(h, \delta) = P_\omega[\kappa_\delta(Z) \geqq c]$.)

THEOREM 7.1. *Let $h = \chi_{\{r \geqq c\}}$, $c > \frac{1}{2}$. Let $\delta = (\beta, Z)$ satisfy*

$$
\begin{aligned}
Z &= 1 && \text{if} \quad f_0/f_1 < k_1 \quad \text{or} \quad f_0/f_1 > k_2 ; \\
(1) \quad &= 1 && \text{with probability} \quad \gamma_i \quad \text{if} \quad f_0/f_1 = k_i , \quad i = 1, 2 ; \\
&= 0 && \text{otherwise}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $k_1 < k_2$, and

$$
\begin{aligned}
\beta &= 1 && \text{if} \quad f_0/f_1 \leqq k_1 \quad \text{and} \quad Z = 1 ; \\
(2) \quad &= 0 && \text{if} \quad f_0/f_1 \geqq k_2 \quad \text{and} \quad Z = 1 ; \\
&= \text{anything in} \quad \{0, 1\} && \text{if} \quad Z = 0
\end{aligned}
$$

where k_i, γ_i are determined by the conditions

$$
(3) \qquad \Pr_\omega(\beta = \omega, Z = 1)/\Pr_\omega(\beta \neq \omega, Z = 1) = c/(1 - c), \qquad \omega = 0, 1 .
$$

If no solution to (1), (2), (3) *exists then let δ be a solution to* (3) *satisfying*

$$Z = 1 \quad if \quad f_0/f_1 \neq k \;;$$

(4) $$= 1 \quad with \; probability \quad \gamma_1 \quad if \quad f_0/f_1 = k \;;$$

$$= 0 \quad otherwise$$

and

$$\beta = 1 \quad if \quad f_0/f_1 > k \quad and \quad Z = 1 \;;$$

(5) $$= 1 \quad with \; probability \quad \gamma_2 \quad if \quad f_0/f_1 = k \quad and \quad Z = 1 \;;$$

$$= 0 \quad otherwise \; if \quad Z = 1 \;;$$

$$= anything \; in \quad \{0, 1\} \quad if \quad Z = 0 \;.$$

If no solution to either of the above sets of equations exists, let $Z \equiv 1$ and let β de-fine the unconditional minimax procedure. Then δ, as defined above, is an optimal procedure.

REMARK. A uniqueness assertion can be added to the above theorem. Except in the third case above, on the set on which $Z = 1$, δ is essentially (a.e. $F_0 + F_1$) uniquely defined as a function of the sufficient statistic f_0/f_1. In the third case above there can be other choices of Z which also yield optimal procedures and, in general, on the set where $Z = 0$ a.e. $(F_0 + F_1)$ the choice of procedure is irrelevant.

PROOF. Let $\delta' = (\beta', Z)$ be any conditional confidence procedure. Let $U = \{z : \kappa_{\delta'}(z) \geq c\}$. Consider the new procedure $\delta'' = (\beta', Z'')$ where $Z'' = \chi_U(Z)$. Then

$$\mathrm{Pr}_\omega \left(\beta' \in D_\omega \,|\, Z'' = 1 \right) \geq \inf_{z \in U} \mathrm{Pr}_\omega \left(\beta' \in D_\omega \,|\, Z = z \right) \geq c \;.$$

It follows via the definitions that δ'' is at least as good as δ'.

The above shows that every procedure is dominated by some other procedure with Range $Z = \{0, 1\}$. Let $\delta' = (\beta', Z'')$ be a procedure of this type. If both $\kappa_{\delta'}(0) \geq c$ and $\kappa_{\delta'}(1) \geq c$ then $B_h(\omega, \delta') = 1$, $\omega = 0, 1$. The fact that $\kappa_{\delta'}(z) \geq c$, $z = 0, 1$, implies that $\mathrm{Pr}_\omega (\beta = \omega) \geq c$ for both $\omega = 0, 1$. Hence the procedure with $Z \equiv 1$ and with β the (unconditional) minimax rule is exactly as good as δ'. This latter rule is of the third form, above.

Now suppose (w.l.o.g.) that $\kappa_{\delta'}(0) < c$ and $\kappa_{\delta'}(1) \geq c$. Then $B_h(\omega, \delta') = \mathrm{Pr}_\omega (Z'' = 1) \leq c^{-1} \mathrm{Pr}_\omega (\beta' = \omega, Z'' = 1)$ since $\kappa_{\delta'}(1) \geq c$; $\omega = 0, 1$. Consider the problem of maximizing $\mathrm{Pr}_0 (\beta = 0, Z = 1)$ subject to the side conditions $\kappa_\delta(1) \geq c$, that is

$$(1 - c) \mathrm{Pr}_0 (\beta = 0, Z = 1) \geq c \, \mathrm{Pr}_0 (\beta = 1, Z = 1) \;,$$

and

$$(1 - c) \mathrm{Pr}_1 (\beta = 1, Z = 1) \geq c \, \mathrm{Pr}_1 (\beta = 0, Z = 1) \;.$$

This is a standard decision theoretic problem, covered by Lehmann [5, Chapter 3, Theorem 5]. The maximizing procedure is any procedure of the form, δ, described in the statement of the theorem. This procedure also satisfies $\mathrm{Pr}_0 (Z = 1) = c^{-1} \mathrm{Pr}_0 (\beta = 0, Z = 1)$ unless $\mathrm{Pr}_0 (Z = 1) = \mathrm{Pr}_1 (Z = 1) = 1$. Hence this

procedure also maximizes $\mathrm{Pr}_0 (Z = 1)$ subject to these side conditions. Symmetrically, the same procedure also maximizes $\mathrm{Pr}_1 (Z = 1)$ subject to the side conditions. This proves the theorem. The uniqueness assertions given in the remark may also be deduced from the above considerations.

SYMMETRIC PROBLEMS. The next result concerns second-sense admissibility in the "symmetric" situation. The general definition of the "symmetric" case, which is treated at length in [2], is that the distribution under F_0 of the random variable f_1/f_0 should be the same as the distribution under F_1 of the random variable f_0/f_1. One of the simplest such situations is where $\chi \sim N(\mu_\omega, \sigma^2)$, $\omega = 0, 1$ with $\mu_0 \neq \mu_1$.

An intuitively appealing procedure in this case is that corresponding to the *maximal symmetric monotone conditioning*. See [2, Section 3.5]. This procedure, δ_0, can be described as follows:

$$Z_0 = \max (f_0, f_1)/(f_0 + f_1) \,;$$
$$\beta_0 = 1 \quad \text{if } f_0/f_1 < 1 \,;$$
$$\quad = 1 \quad \text{with probability } \tfrac{1}{2} \text{ if } f_0/f_1 = 1 \,;$$
$$\quad = 0 \quad \text{if } f_0/f_1 > 1 \,.$$

There is a generalization of this procedure to asymmetric problems. This is described above Theorem 7.4.

THEOREM 7.2. *Consider the symmetric case and the proceduce corresponding to the maximal symmetric monotone conditioning. Then, δ is totally maxmin and totally admissible (second sense).*

REMARKS. Again a uniqueness assertion is possible. If the distribution of f_1/f_0 is nonatomic then the above procedure is the essentially unique (a.e. $F_0 + F_1$) procedure having the given properties and depending only on the sufficient statistic f_1/f_0.

PROOF. Let $0 < c < 1$ and let $h(r) = (r - c)^+$. The proof begins with a demonstration that δ_0 is "Bayes" relative to h and the symmetric prior, which places equal probability on $\omega = 0, 1$.

For any procedure δ let $S_\delta = \{z : \kappa_\delta(z) \geqq c\}$. Then the expected benefit of δ under the symmetric prior is

$$B(0, \delta)/2 + B(1, \delta)/2$$
$$= E_0((\kappa_\delta - c)^+)/2 + E_1((\kappa_\delta - c)^+)/2$$
(7.1)
$$\leqq E_0((\mathrm{Pr}_0 (\beta = 0 \mid Z) - c)\chi_{S_\delta})/2 + E_1((\mathrm{Pr}_1 (\beta = 1 \mid Z) - c)\chi_{S_\delta})/2$$
$$= [\mathrm{Pr}_0 (\beta = 0, S_\delta) + \mathrm{Pr}_1 (\beta = 1, S_\delta) - c(\mathrm{Pr}_0 (S_\delta) + \mathrm{Pr}_1 (S_\delta))]/2$$
$$\leqq (\tfrac{1}{2}) \int_{T_\delta} [\max (f_0, f_1) - c(f_0 + f_1)] \, d\nu \,,$$

where $T_\delta = Z^{-1}(S_\delta)$.

The right hand side of (7.1) is maximized over arbitrary sets, T, by choosing $T = \{x : \max(f_0, f_1) \geqq c(f_0 + f_1)\} = \{x : Z_0(x) \geqq c\}$.

Compute that $\kappa_\delta(Z_0(x)) = Z_0(x)$ in view of the symmetry of the problem and of (β_0, Z_0). See for example [2, Section 1 (following (1.3)) and Section 3.5]. Hence $T_{\delta_0} = \{x : Z_0(x) \geqq c\}$.

Furthermore $\Pr_0(\beta_0 = 0 \mid Z_0) = \Pr_0(\beta_0 = 1 \mid Z_0) = \kappa_{\delta_0}$ and $\beta_0 = i : f_i = \max(f_0, f_1)$. Hence equality holds throughout (7.1) for the procedure δ_0. This shows that δ_0 is Bayes relative to $h(r) = (r - c)^+$ and the symmetric prior.

If $h = \chi_{\{1\}}$ then $B_h(\omega, \delta) \leqq \Pr_\omega(f_0/f_1 = 0 \text{ or } \infty) = B_h(\omega, \delta_0)$ for $\omega = 0, 1$. Hence δ_0 is optimum for this particular h, and so a fortiori is Bayes for the symmetric prior.

For any given nondecreasing convex h on $[0, 1]$ and any $\varepsilon \geqq 0$ it is possible to write $0 \leqq h - \sum_{i=1}^n a_i h_i \leqq \varepsilon$ where each $a_i \geqq 0$ and each h_i is either of the form $\chi_{\{1\}}$ or $(r - c_i)^+$. By the above, δ_0 is Bayes relative to $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i h_i$ and the symmetric prior. Since $B(h, \delta) \leqq h(1)$ for all δ this yields that δ_0 is $\varepsilon h(1)$—Bayes relative to the symmetric prior. Hence δ_0 is Bayes, since ε is arbitrary in the above.

Since δ_0 is Bayes relative to h and the symmetric prior and since $B_h(0, \delta_0) = B_h(1, \delta_0)$ (by symmetry) it follows that δ_0 is maxmin and admissible relative to h. Hence δ_0 is totally maxmin and totally admissible.

It is tempting to believe that δ_0, as defined above, is actually an optimum (second sense) procedure. In other words to believe that $B_h(\omega, \delta_0) \leqq B_h(\omega, \delta)$ for all convex nondecreasing h, all $\omega \in \Omega$, and all δ. This proposition appears to us to be true if the alternative procedures, δ, are restricted to be monotone. However it is not, in general, true. The following simple example shows that δ_0 is not optimum in the simple symmetric situation described there. Careful perusal of the example should suffice to convince the reader that for most symmetric problems and for many reasonable gain functions δ_0 is not optimum. (One prominent exception would be the very special case where f_0/f_1 takes on just two values (a.e. $F_0 + F_1$).)

EXAMPLE 7.3 (δ_0 *is not optimum* (*second sense*)). Let $f_0(x) = [x]/6$ for $1 \leqq x \leqq 4$ where "[ ]" denotes "largest integer in". Let $f_1 = \frac{2}{3} - f_0$. This problem is symmetric. Let $h(r) = r$. Choose constants a, b which satisfy

(7.2) $$3a^2 = b^2 - 4b + \tfrac{15}{4}$$

(7.3) $$(1 - a + 2b)(3(1 - a) + 2b) = b^2 - 4b + \tfrac{15}{4}$$

and $\frac{1}{2} < b < 1$, $0 < a < 1$. The following reasoning shows that a solution exists to (7.2), (7.3). For every $b \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$, (7.2) always has one solution $a \in (0, 1)$. If $b = \frac{1}{2}$ and (7.2) is satisfied with $0 < a < 1$ (i.e. $a = +(\frac{2}{3})^{\frac{1}{2}}$) then the left side of (7.3) is smaller than the right, but if $b = 1$ and (7.2) is satisfied with $0 < a < 1$ (i.e. $a = \frac{1}{2}$) then the opposite inequality relates the two sides of (7.3). Hence continuity implies that a suitable solution exists to this pair of equations.

Now, consider the procedure δ_1, say, defined by

$$\beta_1, Z_1 = (1, 1) \quad \text{if} \quad 1 \leqq x < a \, ;$$
$$= (0, 1) \quad \text{if} \quad 2 + b \leqq x < 3 - (1 - b)/2 \quad \text{or} \quad \tfrac{7}{2} \leqq x < 4 \, ;$$
$$= (1, 2) \quad \text{if} \quad a \leqq x < 2 + b \, ; \quad \text{and}$$
$$= (0, 2) \quad \text{if} \quad 3 - (1 - b)/2 \leqq x < \tfrac{7}{2} \, .$$

The procedure δ_1 is not monotone. It has Range $Z = \{1, 2\}$. It is straightfor-
ward to check, using (7.2), (7,3), that $\Pr_0 (\beta_1 = 0 \mid Z_1 = i) = \Pr_1 (\beta_1 = 1 \mid Z_1 = i)$
$i = 1, 2$. Hence $B(1, \delta_1) = E_1(h(\kappa_{\delta_1}(Z(x)))) = E_1(\Pr_1 (\beta_1 = 1 \mid Z_1)) = \Pr_1 (\beta_1 = 1) = $
$\tfrac{1}{2} + b/3 > \tfrac{2}{3}$. Meanwhile $B(1, \delta_0) = \Pr_1 (\beta_0 = 1) = \tfrac{2}{3}$. Hence δ_0 does not domi-
nate δ_1. (On the other hand $B(0, \delta_1) = \tfrac{5}{6} - \tfrac{6}{3} < \tfrac{2}{3} = B(0, \delta_0)$ so that δ_1 does not
dominate δ_0, so this example is consistent with Theorem 7.2.)

THE ASYMMETRIC CASE. The situation in the asymmetric case is not as trans-
parent. The appropriate generalization of the procedure δ_0 of Theorem 7.2 is
the *maximal monotone procedure* having $E_0(\beta = 0 \mid Z) = E_1(\beta = 1 \mid Z)$. This pro-
cedure is fully described in [2, Section 3.5]. Briefly, it can be obtained by first
rewriting the problem via a 1-1 change of variables so that f_0/f_1 is a nondecreas-
ing function, then setting $Z_0(x) = \min (\int_{-\infty}^{x} (f_0(t)f_1(t))^{\frac{1}{2}}\nu(dt), \int_{x}^{\infty} (f_0(t)f_1(t))^{\frac{1}{2}}\nu(dt))$,
and then choosing $\beta_0 = 1$ or 0 according to whether the first or second of the
preceding integrals is larger. (Take $\beta_0 = 1$ with probability $\tfrac{1}{2}$ if the two integrals
are equal.)

In this form a special role is played by the value c_0 such that $\int_{-\infty}^{c_0^-} f_0(t)f_1(t)\nu(dt) \leqq \tfrac{1}{2}$
and $\int_{c_0^+}^{\infty} f_0(t)f_1(t)\nu(dt) \leqq \tfrac{1}{2}$, since β decides 1 or 0 if $x < c_0$ or $x > c_0$, respectively.
(If $\nu(\{c_0\}) > 0$ then β will be randomized at c_0, in order to guarantee $E_0(\beta = 0 \mid Z) =$
$E_1(\beta = 1 \mid Z)$.)

If $h(r) = r$ then $B_h(\omega, \delta) = \Pr_\omega (\beta = \omega)$. It is easy to construct many asym-
metric examples in which $\nu(\{c_0\}) = 0$ to avoid randomization and $\Pr_1 (x < c_0) \neq$
$\Pr_0 (x > c_0)$. In any such example δ_0 will not be maxmin relative to $h(r) = r$.
In general, no matter what the given h, δ_0 may not be maxmin relative to h.
Of course this is more than enough to see that δ_0 will not in general be totally
maxmin.

However, it is reasonable to conjecture that δ_0 is totally admissible (second
sense). The following theorem demonstrates a fairly strong admissibility prop-
erty of δ_0. The property is interesting on its own merit and motivates the con-
jecture that δ_0 is totally admissible.

THEOREM 7.4. *Let $h(r) = (r - c)^+$. Then the maximal monotone procedure is
admissible relative to h.*

PROOF. Fix $c \geqq \tfrac{1}{2}$. (The values $c < \tfrac{1}{2}$ are uninteresting.) It will be shown
that δ_0 is Bayes relative to a prior which gives some mass $p = p(c)$ to $\omega = 0$,
$0 < p < 1$. The admissibility assertion follows immediately from this fact.
[Note in the following argument that p depends partly on the choice of c. For

this reason the Bayes property described above cannot be used to prove total admissibility as in the symmetric case of Theorem 7.2.]

For any procedure δ let $T_\delta = \{x : \kappa(Z(x)) \geq c\}$. (The argument requires trivial modifications if Z is randomized.) Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
(7.4) \quad & pB_h(0, \delta) + qB_h(1, \delta) \\
& \qquad \leq p[\mathrm{Pr}_0\,(T_\delta,\, \beta = 0) - c\,\mathrm{Pr}_0\,(T_\delta)] + q[\mathrm{Pr}_1\,(T_\delta,\, \beta = 1) - c\,\mathrm{Pr}_1(T_\delta)] \\
& \qquad = pE_0((1 - c)\varphi_0 - c\varphi_1) + qE_1(-c\varphi_0 + (1 - c)\varphi_1)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\varphi_i = \chi_{T_\delta, \beta = i}$ $i = 1, 2$. The right side of (7.4) is maximized by choosing

$$
\begin{aligned}
\varphi_0 &= \chi_{\{x : f_0/f_1 \geq cq/p(1-c)\}} \\
\varphi_1 &= \chi_{\{x : f_0/f_1 \leq (1-c)q/cp\}}\,.
\end{aligned}
$$

(Actually φ_0 and φ_1 are irrelevant at any x such that $f_0(x)/f_1(x) = cq/p(1 - c) = (1 - c)q/cp$, which can occur if, and only if, $c = \frac{1}{2}$.)

Suppose $z = Z_0(a) = Z_0(b)$ with $a < c_0 < b$. Computations then yield that

$$
(7.5) \qquad \kappa(z) = f_0(a)/(f_0(a) + \Delta f_0(b)) + \Delta f_1(b)/(f_1(a) + \Delta f_1(b))
$$

where $\Delta = (f_0(a)f_1(a)/f_0(b)f_1(b))^{\frac{1}{2}}$. Let a_c denote the (a) value of $a \leq c_0$ such that $\kappa(z_c^-) \geq c$ and $\kappa(z_c^+) \leq c$ where $z_c = Z_0(a_c)$ and let b_c be the corresponding value of $b \geq c_0$. The above expression for $\kappa(z)$ yields that

$$
(7.6) \qquad f_0(a_c)/f_1(a_c) = (\kappa(z_c)/(1 - \kappa(z_c)))^2(f_0(b_c)/f_1(b_c))\,.
$$

Now, choose p so that $f_0(a_c^-)/f_1(a_c^-) \leq (1 - c)q/cp$ and $f_0(a_c^+)/f_1(a_c^+) \geq (1 - c)q/cp$. By construction $f_0(x)/f_1(x) \leq (1 - c)q/cp$ if and only if $x \leq a_c(x < a_c)$ if $\kappa(z_c) \geq c$ ($\kappa(z_c) < c$, respectively). This is precisely the set on which $\kappa(z) \geq c$ and $\beta = 1$.

It follows algebraically from the above equations that $f_0(x)/f_1(x) \geq cq/p(1 - c)$ if and only if $x \geq b_c$ ($x > b_c$) if $\kappa(z_c) \geq c$ ($\kappa(z_c) < c$, respectively). This is the set on which $\kappa(z) \geq c$ and $\beta = 0$.

The above facts show that δ_0 maximizes $pB_h(0, \delta_0) + qB_h(1, \delta)$ so that δ_0 is Bayes, as desired. This completes the proof.

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