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ON MODAL RENDERINGS OF INTUITIONISTIC PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC

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The intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) of Heyting¹ rests upon the following eleven axioms:

(A1) $p \rightarrow (p \land p)$ (A2) $(p \land q) \rightarrow (q \land p)$ (A3) $(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow [(p \land r) \rightarrow (q \land r)]$ (A4) $[(p \rightarrow q) \land (p \rightarrow r)] \rightarrow [p \rightarrow r]$ (A5) $q \rightarrow (p \rightarrow q)$ (A6) $[p \land (p \rightarrow q)] \rightarrow q$ (A7) $p \rightarrow (p \lor q)$ (A8) $(p \lor q) \rightarrow (q \lor p)$ (A9) $[(p \rightarrow r) \land (q \rightarrow r)] \rightarrow [(p \lor q) \rightarrow r]$ (A10) $\neg p \rightarrow (p \rightarrow q)$ (A11) $[(p \rightarrow q) \land (p \rightarrow \neg q)] \rightarrow \neg p$

Here the symbols ' \rightarrow ', ' \wedge ', ' $\underline{\vee}$ ', and ' \neg ' are used for intuitionistic implication, conjunction, disjunction, and negation, respectively.

Moreover, there are certain theses which Heyting in his book of 1956 specifically and explicitly rejects as intuitionistically unacceptable:

(U1)
$$(p \lor q) \rightarrow (p \lor q)$$
 [See p. 97.]
(U2) $\sim p \rightarrow \neg p$ [See pp. 18-19, 97-98.]
(U3) $p \lor \neg p$ [See p. 99.]
(U4) $\neg \neg p \rightarrow p$ [See p. 99.]
(U5) $(p \rightarrow q) \lor (q \rightarrow p)$ [See p. 99.]
(U6) $\neg (p \land q) \rightarrow (\neg p \lor \neg q)$ [See p. 100.]
(U7) $(\neg q \rightarrow \neg p) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow q)$ [See p. 101.]
(U8) $\neg \neg (p \lor q) \rightarrow (\neg \neg p \lor \neg \neg q)$ [See p. 101.]

The symbols '~', '&', and 'v' will be used for 'ordinary'' (non-intuitionistic) negation, conjunction, and disjunction, respectively; and ' \supset ' will be used below for material implication.

Various "dictionaries" for "translating" statement schemata of IPC into the vocabulary of Lewis' systems of strict implication have been or can

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