

ON THE ELIMINABILITY OF DE RE MODALITIES IN SOME SYSTEMS

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1* M. J. Cresswell has tried to show¹ in [1] that the so called *de re modalities* are not eliminable in the system S, where $S = LPC + S5 + Pr$. The axiom schema **Pr**, or

$$(a)(L\beta a \vee L \sim \beta a) \vee (a)(M\beta a \wedge M \sim \beta a),$$

is deemed by Cresswell to be a fair formal representative of von Wright's *principle of predication*.² In this form it is an extremely strong principle. Thus, it can be easily shown that (Lemma 2, section 3)

$$LPC + T + Pr \vdash (x_1) \dots (x_n) \{L(\alpha x_1 \dots x_n \equiv \alpha y_1 \dots y_n) \vee L(\alpha x_1 \dots x_n \equiv \sim \alpha y_1 \dots y_n)\},$$

where T is the "minimal" modal logic containing the axiom of necessity, the axiom of *L*-distribution over ' $\supset$ ', and the rule of necessitation.

The above lemma shows, in semantic terms, that **Pr** is strong enough to trivialize modal logic to the extent that the behavior of any context with *n* free variables is completely determined in any given model by: (a) describing how it behaves "across" the model (i.e., in every "world" therein) for some arbitrary fixed *n*-tuple and (b) describing how it behaves for each other *n*-tuple at some world or another. Cresswell's work suggests that this trivialization may not be sufficient to render empty, semantically, the distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* modalities.[†]

Moreover Professor Cresswell suspects³ that even the further addition of the schema:

$$L(\exists a)\beta \equiv (\exists a)L\beta \quad (\text{ELC, henceforth})$$

may not be equal to the job. We shall show by a simple proof, however,

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[†](Added in proofs) But meanwhile we have proved in [6] that $LPC + S5 + Pr \vdash ELC$ and, therefore, by the present paper's results, that the distinction is rendered empty (even syntactically).