

IDENTITY

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1 It has become an axiom or accepted as an obvious truth that any description of an ontology must include some "principle of individuation" or method of determining when we have one entity and when we have two. The trouble with an "event ontology" has often been put in those terms—when do we have one and when two events? Is World War II and a particular bomb exploding in it one or two events? If the movements of atomic particles are the primary or "atomic" events, at what point along the space-time continuum do we have a second event?

Another example of the puzzles which arise from trying to decide when you have one or two entities is in the case of "intensional entities." P. T. Geach, in a paper "Intensional Identity,"¹ writes:

We have intensional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, whether or not there actually is something at that focus.

Suppose a reporter is describing an outbreak of witch mania, let us say in Gotham village.

(1) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow.

Quine has distinguished *opaque* and *transparent* ways of construing indirect-speech clauses, but neither sort of construction will give an appropriate sense to (1). For if the indirect-speech clauses in (1) are constructed opaquely, then each clause must stand on its own syntactically . . . But on the face of it we have in (1) a pronoun, 'she' or 'the same', bound to an antecedent, 'a witch', that lies outside the clause containing the pronoun; so unless this *prima facie* can be discounted . . . the clauses in (1) cannot be construed opaquely.

On the other hand, there is no obvious way of construing the indirect speech in (1) transparently. We might try:

1. *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. LXIV (1967). The numbering of statements in this, and other quotes, have been changed.